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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
"The quantitative and qualitative significance of the EU law on equality between 
men and women is undisputed. The amount of legislation and the number and 
importance of decisions by the European Court exceed any other area of social 
policy. The fundamental principles created in the context of this evolution have 
had an impact of EU law going far beyond the area of policy concerned. It has 
probably had greater influence on the domestic law of the member states than any 
other area of social law and policy.1 
The article continues, "Equal opportunities between women and men has been in 
the forefront of the social policy of the European Communities since its 
beginnings. Article 119 of the Rome Treaty, Directives on Equal Pay, Equal 
Treatment and Social Security, the extensive case law of the European Court of 
Justice (beginning with Defrenne v. Belgium), and a quantity of 'soft law' (such 
as the recommendation on the promotion of positive action) have contributed to 
the prominence of this social policy. It has been argued that equal treatment of 
men and women has achieved the status of a 'fundamental right'." 
It may be a fundamental right, but has it worked? 
This paper wi l l examine maternity rights in the United Kingdom and the impact 
of European law upon such rights. 
Against a dramatically changing background to women's participation in 
employment, it wi l l show how the U.K. Maternity Rights f i t within European 
1 Bercusson, B., European Labour Law. (1996) Butterworths, p. 169 
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Community law as a result of the Equal Treatment Directive (76/207/EEC), the 
Pregnant Workers Directive (92/85/EEC), the Parental Leave Directive 
(96/34/EC), and other forthcoming measures. The paper wi l l also indicate some 
areas of conflict between U.K. Law and European Law, as well as attempting to 
focus on some criticisms of the way in which UK and European law have 
attempted to deal with sex equality. 
The paper wi l l indicate that whilst there have been some major successes, 
highlighted by individual cases, there is, in the U K at least, a very ad hoc 
approach to maternity rights, and that there has been a marked reluctance to move 
away from UK perceptions of maternity law towards European perceptions. 
Additionally, the paper w i l l argue that there has been a failure to address the 
wider aspects of maternity rights, particularly in terms of parental leave within the 
United Kingdom, although this w i l l shortly be dealt with by the legislature. Some 
consideration wi l l also be given to feminist jurisprudential criticism of the anti-
discrimination legislation and court decisions, although this w i l l not form a 
particularly large part of this thesis. 
It w i l l also be argued that the fundamental attack on pregnancy as an illness, 
mounted by the European Court of Justice, has not been followed through to its 
logical conclusion, and that the Court and the law remains confused, searching for 
a legally and logically non-existent distinction between pregnancy and maternity 
connected issues pre-, during-, and post-birth, particularly after the maternity 
leave period has expired. 
Finally, there wi l l be an attempt to focus on the future for the UK's maternity 
laws. 
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Inevitably, this focus wi l l shift depending upon our political masters. The Labour 
Government of Tony Blair has already shown a very fresh approach to Europe, 
and we can shortly expect major changes in view of the Government's 
commitment to family friendly policies, for example, adoption of the Parental 
Leave Directive via the Employment Relations B i l l currently before Parliament. 
The paper wi l l attempt to explain a number of the difficulties, and to clarify some 
outstanding issues. It was hardly surprising that Laura Cox, QC wrote "all this 
has resulted in a confusing and complicated array of Domestic and European 
Legislative Provisions, giving rights subject to different qualifying conditions and 
notification requirements; and, further, in a mass of discrimination case law, 
answering some questions but tantalisingly posing many others. Much new law 
remains to be decided that legal complexity is all the more regrettable when 
it occurs in laws which govern the every day lives of working people."2 
2 Palmer, Camilla, Maternity Rights. (1996) Legal Action Group, Foreword by Laura Cox, QC, p. vi 
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CHAPTER 2 MATERNITY RIGHTS 
For the last f i f ty years or so the participation of women in the labour market has 
changed beyond all recognition, and whilst women find themselves working in 
ever increasing numbers, and working as mothers in increasing numbers, they 
maintain an unfortunate stranglehold over the majority of poorly paid, part time 
and occupationally segregated positions. 
Walby writes "there has been a massive growth in the number of women who are 
in formal waged employment since the Second World War. There are nearly as 
many women as men who are employees in employment - 49.6% were women in 
1995 .... since the 1950s women have moved from being around one third to one 
half of employees The changes are most marked among married women, 
whose economic activity rate has increased from 26% in 1951 to 7 1 % in 1991. 
This is now little different from that of unmarried women "< 
Slightly more recent figures4 show that there were almost 12.2 million women in 
the workplace. This represents an economic activity rate of 71.4%, with women 
comprising more than 44% of the entire workforce. In the ten years to 1997, the 
economic activity rate of those with young children has shown a particularly 
notable increase, rising from 42% to 55% for those with children under five years 
of age. 55% of women with children aged up to four years are economically 
active, whilst for those with children aged five to ten years, this figure rises to 
7 1 % . 
1 Walby, S., Gender Transformations. (1997) Routledge, p. 27 
4 Labour Market Trends. March 1998 
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Statistics also indicate that females do not necessarily leave their employment due 
to childbirth. For those with children under four years, the survey shows that 40% 
of those in work had a level of service with their present employer of over five 
years. Slightly over 20% of mothers with children aged up to four had been in 
employment prior to giving birth, and had not left since the birth. 
In a recent report5 by the Policy Studies Institute, it was found that 67% of those 
in employment giving birth in 1996 returned to work within eleven months of 
giving birth. The data was compared with a previous survey conducted in 1988, 
which showed that only 45% of female employees working during their 
pregnancy returned to employment within nine months of the birth of a child. 
Very interestingly, the survey found that those most likely to return to work were 
those who were able to take advantage of extended maternity leave. The figure in 
this case was 72%. 
The same report also found that approximately a third of women returning from 
maternity leave who had previously been employed on a fu l l time basis were able 
to return on a part time basis. The report also highlighted that of those returning 
to part time work who had previously worked fu l l time, 50% of those giving birth 
for the first time had elected to follow this route. Approximately 25% of those 
who did not return following their maternity leave stated that this was because 
they were unable to accommodate their child caring and job responsibilities 
within appropriate and suitable hours. 
The survey does not deal with an important phenomenon, namely that those who 
return frequently suffer downward occupational mobility. In other words, 
5 Callender, Millward, Lissenburgh, Forth, Maternity Rights and Benefits in Britain. (1996), DSS 
Research Series, Report No. 76 
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because there is no right under English law to return to an identical job (after 
extended maternity leave), it is perfectly possible that the woman wi l l return to a 
job of lower pay or status. It may well be that the law does not technically allow 
this, but any attempt to return part time (which, again, is not a legal requirement 
in the United Kingdom), i f agreed, w i l l frequently be on the basis of a lower level 
position. (This chapter w i l l examine the possible responses to such circumstances 
via indirect sex discrimination claims). 
This serves only to perpetuate gender differentials and, frequently because of 
employers' perceptions, low skills and training. 
It has been stated that "despite the economic changes of recent years, women's 
increased labour market participation, and changes in family structure, such as 
increases in divorce and single parenthood, there appears to be enormous stability 
in women's and men's domestic roles and the value system that underpins 
them women's role as primary child carers causes severe disruption to their 
long term labour market position. This is mirrored in the fact that male 
breadwinners increase their career opportunities over their lifetime and enjoy a 
substantial earnings premium in the process "'• 
This huge growth in the participation of women in the labour market has occurred 
without any significant increase in (formal) childcare provision. In this respect, it 
is interesting to note that there is a quite literally, staggering rise in part time 
employment for women, with only a relatively modest rise for men. "The increase 
in fu l l time women workers from 1971 to 1975 is less than 200,000, a rise of only 
3%. During the same period the number of women working part time has 
6 MacEwan Scott, A., Gender Segregation and Social Change, and the SCELI Research. (1994), OUP, p. 
34 
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increased by over two million, that is 75%, and as a percentage for total 
employment has risen from 13% to 23%. Women are now almost as likely to be 
working part time as fu l l time, that is, 47%."' 
"Male part time employment has been growing, but not on the same scale, rising 
to 11% of male workers in 1994. Most of this is concentrated among young 
people, often students, and among older workers, while that among women is 
more widely spread among various age groups "» 
Many employers have found this growth in flexible, part time working 
significantly to their advantage. It has frequently meant that an employer could 
have a more malleable, less unionised, less educated, and less well paid 
workforce, and that when women have caused 'trouble' they have simply dropped 
out of the labour market or moved on to another employer. 
With the sharp growth in the employment of women in the labour market, the 
pressures of adherence to the familial ideology that assumes "that a woman's 
work outside the home should not interfere with her domestic responsibilities in 
caring for her husband and particularly in caring for her children and other 
dependant relatives"9 have inevitably brought employers and employees into 
conflict. 
In spite of modern legislative changes, ad hoc evidence suggests that the attitude 
to women in the workplace (even amongst larger employers providing rights 
better than those required under law) is far from satisfactory. In a recent report 
7 Walby, S., Gender Transformations. (1997) Routledge, p. 31 
8 Walby, S., Gender Transformations. (1997) Routledge, p. 32 
9 Beechey, V., Women's Employment in Contemporary Britain, in Beechey, V. and Whitegg, E. , (eds.) 
Women in Britain Today, (1986), OUP, p. 125 
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from the University of Loughborough,10 statistics indicated that female employees 
who are pregnant are regarded as "invalids". Moreover, the report elucidated that 
significant attitudes to pregnant women still remain in the form that mother 
should be at home, and also that pregnant female workers were endangering 
themselves, their children, and others. The situation is further complicated by a 
lack of clarity in what is surely one of the most incomprehensible areas of the law. 
This stems from the rather bizarre way in which maternity rights have come about 
in the United Kingdom. It would doubtless surprise many young working 
mothers to know that prior to 1975, the United Kingdom did not provide 
employees with any maternity rights. Indeed, in those early days, employers were 
prepared to take far more risks with women's rights than they might now. 
It would also doubtless surprise many to note that the English statutes themselves 
were not bome from the EEC directives, and this, to some degree, accounts for 
the rather piecemeal approach which the UK legislature has taken to issues such 
as maternity rights and equal pay. 
"The argument is that there had built up very strong domestic pressures for 
legislation on equal opportunities for women in the early 1970s so that action in 
this area was inevitable, whether or not required by British membership of the 
EEC."" 
1(1 University of Loughborough, Pregnancy and Employment: The Perceptions and Beliefs of Fellow 
Workers 
1 1 Davies, P., European Equality Legislation. UK Legislative Policy and Industrial Relations, in Women, 
Employment and European Equality Law, McCrudden, C. ed., Eclipse (1987), p. 35 
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Thus, it was provided in 1975 that there would be rights to maternity leave and 
maternity pay, and that women would be protected from unfair dismissal due to 
pregnancy. The latter, however, was within the ambit of the unfair dismissal 
legislation rather than anything specific to pregnancy, or based upon sex 
discrimination laws. 
It was to take ten years before it was accepted that treating a woman differently 
on the grounds of her pregnancy could amount to sex discrimination. In Hayes v. 
Malleable Working Mens Club H9851 IRLR 367. this principle was 
acknowledged, but still not on an entirely equal basis, with the woman being 
required to use the 'sick male comparator', namely a man off work in supposedly 
similar circumstances. 
The exercise of those maternity rights was, of course, very much dependent upon 
the length of service of the female employee. It used to be the case that those 
working more than sixteen hours per week could attract maternity rights after two 
years service, whilst those working eight to fifteen hours per week had to wait 
until they had completed five years service. Those working less than eight hours 
per week would never attract maternity rights. 
So, it took ten years from the introduction of maternity rights to Hayes, and it was 
to take another ten years before the thresholds were to be reviewed. 
The difference between the rights of full-timers and part-timers was finally 
addressed by the House of Lords in R v. Secretary of State for Employment, ex 
parte Equal Opportunities Commission[1994] IRLR 176 and, thereafter, by 
Statutory Instrument on 6 t n February, 1995. The House of Lords held that these 
requirements were sexually discriminatory in their nature; there are no longer any 
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hours thresholds in the United Kingdom providing for eligibility for maternity 
rights. 
The river which has been running alongside the stream of U K employment rights 
came when the United Kingdom joined the European Economic Community on 
1 s t January, 1973. 
We are now members of the European Union, and in legal terms, this has had a 
massive impact. 
The United Kingdom has effectively ceded certain areas of its legal sovereignty to 
the European Community, and the Treaty of Rome is described as having 
established a new legal order. 
Because of this, European Community Law is regarded as the highest order, and 
where UK Law conflicts, or is incompatible with European Community Law, then 
European Community Law w i l l take precedence. In other words, the relationship 
between EC Law and national law is one of the supremacy of Community Law. 
The European Court of Justice first established this view in Algemene 
Transporten Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse 
Administratie der Belastingen [19631 CMLR 105. in which it stated " .... the 
Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of 
which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, 
and the subjects of which comprise not only member states but also their 
nationals," at p. 129. 
One of the areas in which this has occurred in the United Kingdom is sex equality, 
and, as mentioned in the comments of Professor Burcusson (quoted in the 
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introduction to this paper), this is an area in which the European Community has 
been particularly active. 
European directives and judgements have certainly shaped English law in recent 
years, and it is true to say that the rather difficult and hide-bound approach under 
the U K discrimination statutes contrasts markedly with what many would see as 
the almost free rein of the European Court of Justice. 
Additionally, not only does the legislature have to respond to Europe, but many 
European laws and judgements create a general climate of opinion which leads to 
a different approach to domestic obligations and responsibilities. 
Within the U K , many were to attempt to use the Sex Discrimination Act to 
enforce their rights, but this proved extremely difficult before the courts, and it is 
striking to note that it took some nine years for this attitude to change, when in 
Webb v. EMQ Air Cargo (UK) Limited \ 19941 ICR 770. the European Court of 
Justice finally put the 'sick male comparator' to the sword. 
The latest wholescale revision to U.K. maternity rights came in October, 1994, 
following the implementation in the United Kingdom of the European Union 
Pregnant Workers Directive (92/85/EEC). (However, it should be noted that the 
Employment Relations Bi l l presently before Parliament wi l l make various 
significant changes, and these w i l l be addressed later in the paper). 
Under the Pregnant Workers Directive, and the Equal Treatment Directive 
(76/207/EEC), a large part of Europe has had a very different approach to equality 
within the workplace. 
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This is an approach to which the U.K. Government has frequently been both 
doctrinally and legally opposed. Sometimes, this opposition has erupted into 
open hostility but, perhaps more worryingly, it has resulted in the Parliamentary 
draughtsman framing legislation or instruments which do not appear entirely to be 
in accord with the European Directives. 
Occasionally, the Directives themselves require judicial interpretation, and 
lawyers and employers alike continually await many key European Court of 
Justice decisions, several of which do not necessarily appear to follow previous 
decisions in any logical manner. Moreover, the European Court of Justice itself 
continues to 'develop' the law in this area. 
Even those maternity rights which came into force in October, 1994 are 
complicated and require clarification. What is undoubted is that all women 
irrespective of length of service or hours worked are now entitled to at least 
fourteen weeks maternity leave. We shall examine these provisions in detail later 
in this paper, as well as future developments in this area, but the outcome in the 
U K of the EU Pregnant Workers' Directive is as set out below. 
Maternity rights are now governed by ss. 7 1 - 8 5 , Employment Rights Act, 1996. 
The provisions are extensive, and it is essentially provided that: 
a) all pregnant female employees are now entitled to take a fourteen week 
maternity leave period irrespective of their length of service or hours of 
work; (s. 73) 
b) for those with more than two years continuous service at the eleventh week 
before the expected week of confinement, there is a right to take up to 
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eleven weeks before the expected week of confinement, and to return to 
work up to twenty nine weeks after the beginning of the week in which the 
baby was born; (s. 79) 
c) there is a right not to be unreasonably refused paid time off for ante-natal 
care, with this right being exercisable irrespective of length of service or 
hours of work; (ss. 55,56) 
d) in conjunction with the Management of Health and Safety at Work 
(Amendments) Regulations 1994, there is a right to a Health and Safety Risk 
Assessment in respect of those who are pregnant, those who have recently 
given birth (i.e. within the last six months), or those who are breastfeeding. 
Various provisions are then provided in order to implement the health and 
safety requirements; 
e) there are special rights relating to dismissal, whereby an employee can claim 
automatically unfair dismissal irrespectively (importantly) of her length of 
service or her hours of work i f the reason or the main reason for her 
dismissal is: 
(i) because she is pregnant, or for any other reason connected with her 
pregnancy; 
(ii) her maternity leave period is ended by dismissal, and the reason for the 
dismissal is that she has had a baby or for any reason connected with 
childbirth (note that this only applies during the maternity leave 
period); 
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(i i i) she was dismissed after the end of her maternity leave period and the 
reason for the dismissal is that she had taken maternity leave or the 
benefits of maternity leave; 
(iv) the reason for the dismissal is a requirement or recommendation to 
suspend the woman on health and safety grounds; 
(v) the woman's maternity leave period is ended by dismissal and the 
reason for the dismissal is that she is redundant and has not been 
offered suitable available employment (this only applies during and up 
to the end of the maternity leave period); 
(vi) where the woman told her employer she would be unable to return to 
work at the end of her maternity leave period and before the end of her 
maternity leave period she provided the employer with a doctor's 
certificate stating she was unable to work for health reasons, and she 
was dismissed during the four weeks after the end of her leave whilst 
incapable of working and where she had a doctor's certificate for the 
period, and the reason for the dismissal was that she had given birth or 
for a reason connected to the birth; and 
(vii) a woman with a right to extended maternity absence is denied her right 
to return because of redundancy and is not offered a suitable 
alternative vacancy, (s. 99) 
f ) During the fourteen week maternity leave, a right to the preservation of her 
terms and conditions (excluding remuneration). In other words, her 
contractual benefits w i l l continue as i f she had not been absent, (s. 71) 
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One of the particular failures of United Kingdom maternity rights has been, at 
face value at least, the inability to address the changed circumstances of the new 
mother. 
This is because U K maternity rights presently have no provision for employees to 
return to work on a part time or flexible basis following the birth of a child. 
It has been argued in some quarters that this a good thing, because to provide 
specifically for the female to be able to return on a part time basis necessarily 
links her with childcare, and thus continues the vicious circle of inequality of 
treatment. 
Notwithstanding this, whilst employers are not required to allow employees to 
return part time following maternity leave, there is a serious risk of a successful 
indirect sex discrimination claim i f the employer insists upon fu l l time working. 
A claim may be brought under section l ( l ) ( b ) , Sex Discrimination Act 1975, on 
the basis that the employer has applied a requirement or condition to a woman 
which could apply equally to a man, but which is such that in practice fewer 
women than men can comply with the requirement or condition; that it is to the 
woman's detriment because she is unable to comply with it; and, that there is no 
justifiable reason irrespective of sex for the employer to apply the requirement or 
condition. 
Even i f the requirement or condition is something which may appear so 
straightforward as stating that a job is fu l l time, this is capable of satisfying the 
first part of the indirect discrimination provisions. 
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Thus, from the original failure of U K maternity rights, there rises a phoenix under 
the sex discrimination laws which can, in many circumstances, enable women to 
bring claims where their employers refuse to allow them to return on a part time 
basis, or, alternatively, insist that the return is under very strict requirements as to 
the hours to be worked. In Home Office v. Holmes 119841 IRLR 299. the 
applicant was one of 250 Executive Officers employed under a contract of 
employment which required her to work fu l l time. After the birth of her first 
child, she found it difficult to work fu l l time, and had to avail herself of 
significant amounts of unpaid leave. After the birth of her second child, she 
requested that she be allowed to return to work on a part time basis. Her 
employers were unsympathetic to her request, and declined to allow i t . 
It was held that the requirement to work fu l l time was a requirement or condition 
within the terms of the Sex Discrimination Act, and it was held also that she had 
been subjected to unlawful discrimination. 
Even i f the applicant can show that insisting that a job is fu l l time or strictly 
prescribing the hours which must be worked constitutes a requirement or 
condition, then it w i l l still be necessary to consider the issue of compliance. 
In this respect, compliance is regarded as compliance in practice rather than 
absolute ability to comply. 
For example, in Price v. Civi l Service Commission [1978] IRLR3. where the EAT 
stated that a woman "is not obliged to marry, or to have children, or to mind 
children; she may find somebody to look after them, and as a last resort, she may 
put them into care." But to say for those reasons that she is unable to comply with 
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a requirement to work fu l l time would be "wholly out of sympathy with the spirit 
and intent of the act." The test is whether the employee can comply in the light of 
"current usual behaviour of women in this respect, as observed in practice, putting 
on one side behaviour and responses which are unusual or extreme," per 
PHILLIPS, J. at p. 293. 
The pool for comparison can be an important issue, but "many tribunals are 
therefore prepared to accept, without any detailed analysis of statistical evidence, 
that a requirement to work on a standard basis disproportionately affects women, 
because they are aware that a large majority of those with primary responsibility 
for child care are women."1 2 
This is illustrated by a recent decision. 
In London Underground v. Edwards (No. 2) [1998] IRLR 364 the pool was 
expanded to look at women in general who have child care responsibilities as 
opposed to men in general, who do not. 
In this case, the applicant was employed as a train operator, working a shift 
system which she was able to organise to f i t in with her responsibilities as a single 
mother. London Underground sought to introduce new rostering arrangements 
under which she would have to commence work at 4.45 a.m., and which would 
also involve excessively long hours. 
Ms. Edwards, complained that this amounted to indirect sex discrimination, and 
her complaint was upheld by the court. It was held that the consideration was 
whether the proportion of women train operators who could comply with the 
requirements was significantly smaller than the proportion of male train operators 
1 2 Cox, Susan, Flexible Working After Maternity Leave: The Legal Framework. 78 EOR 10, p. 11 
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that could comply. Surprisingly, it was also held that the requirement was not 
justifiable, for the employer could have made provision for single mothers 
without significant detriment to its need to achieve savings or improve efficiency. 
The decision is perhaps even more striking given that there were some 2,023 
male drivers, and 21 female drivers. Of those female drivers, only Ms. Edwards 
was unable to comply with the re-rostering. 
"The Industrial Tribunal was entitled to have regard to the large discrepancy in 
numbers between male and female numbers making up the pool for its 
consideration. Not one of the male component of just over 2,000 men was unable 
to comply with the rostering arrangements. On the other hand, one woman could 
not comply out of the female component of only 21 . It seems to me that the 
comparatively small size of the female component indicated, again without the 
need for specific evidence, both that it was either difficult or unattractive for 
women to work as train operators in any event, and that the figure of 95.2% of 
women unable to comply was likely to be a minimum rather than a maximum 
figure," per POTTER, L . J. at p. 369. 
An employee is normally able to establish the issue of detriment by indicating the 
difficulties she w i l l face by trying to combine her fu l l time job and her new family 
responsibilities and it w i l l then be for the employer to justify the requirement to 
work full-time, or on strictly specified hours, irrespective of sex. 
Imposing a blanket policy against part-time working or job sharing has been 
shown to have been very likely to amount to indirect discrimination, and i f the 
employer accepts that women can return to part time roles in certain parts of the 
organisation, it has proved very difficult to deny such a return to other roles. 
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For employers to counter a return to part-time working, significant practical 
evidence wi l l be required based on the particular employment rather than on any 
generalised opposition. 
The approach of the European Court of Justice to the issue of justification can be 
found in Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v. Weber von Hartz [19861 IRLR 317. 
The European Court of Justice has stated that a practice which has a 
disproportionate and adverse impact on one sex is justifiable and corresponds to a 
real need on the part of the employer, i f it is appropriate with a view to achieving 
the objective in question, and is necessary to that end. In other words, is it 
tantamount to a genuine material factor? 
However, it should be remembered that the employer must achieve some sort of 
balance between its justification and the disproportionate impact which is being 
placed upon a group. The more severe the impact, the more likely it is that the 
employer may well have to shift and do something about matters. 
In Hicks v. North Yorkshire County Council (CQIT 1643/117). a school teacher 
sought to return to work part time following her maternity leave. The IT held that 
the Council's refusal to allow her to do so was indirectly discriminatory. The 
Council had stated that "there may be difficulties in obtaining a suitably qualified 
teacher in this area on a part-time basis". It was held that this objection was 
simply "a matter of principle against part-time teachers, nothing less and nothing 
more", and this was indicated by the fact the Council had previously used part-
timers to cover for absentee teachers. 
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This back door route to a rather successful approach to providing the flexibility 
that is often required with new parenthood (but only for the mother) means that 
employers have to justify their insistence upon full-time working. 
By way of example, this means that the employer may seek to argue that the 
seniority of the job requires that it can be done only on a full-time basis. This, in 
turn, is very difficult to prove, and the employer has to supply hard evidence on 
the need for continuity, special skills, and defined operational matters. 
Frequently, the employee is able to challenge this purely on the basis that there 
has been no proper assessment of her particular duties, and any difficulties which 
might arise should the job be the subject of a job share. 
In Guthrie v. Royal Bank of Scotland pic (COIT 1869/196). the employer refused 
to allow a woman to return from maternity leave on a part time basis. The bank 
stated that it was not its practice to allow such a return because of the disruption it 
would cause to working arrangements. It was held that this was indirectly sex 
discriminatory, for all that was needed was a "relatively minor adjustment" to 
allow Guthrie to undertake her duties on a part time basis. 
In order to prove justification, the employer might have to show that the woman 
was the only person with specialist knowledge or a particular set of skills, and 
even i f that question can be answered positively, the employer w i l l still have to 
show proper commercial reasons for such skills or expertise to be continuously 
available. It should be remembered that this can still be rebutted by the employee 
raising the question of what happens when she is not there. For example, what 
was the position whilst she was away on maternity leave, or is away from the 
office visiting clients, suppliers, attending training, absent through sickness, or 
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away on holiday? Could the workload which was redistributed while she was 
away on maternity leave not be similarly redistributed now? 
A case which shows how the employer can justify its insistence on full-time 
working is Eley v. Huntleigh Diagnostics Limited (unreported) in which the 
female applicant was employed as a receptionist in a business which relied 
primarily on telephone sales. 
Whilst the applicant had been away on maternity leave, there had been a number 
of problems in respect of inaccurately recorded or directed telephone calls. The 
employers took the view fact that continuity of service had been imperilled during 
the applicant's absence, and that it was important to preserve this upon her return. 
The IT held the holder of Ms. Eley's job performed a vital role in dealing with 
telephone sales enquiries, and as such, the company's insistence upon continuity 
was justifiable. 
The courts might still instruct an employer to recruit another part time employee. 
In Given v. Scottish Power pic (S/3172/94). a female manager sought to return 
part time to her position. The company informed her that at her grade she could 
not job share. The employers argued that this was on the basis of an operational 
need, and that continuity was important given that the applicant dealt with 
customers in a "hands on" role. The IT held that the female employee had been 
indirectly discriminated against. It was accepted that i f a customer were to 
telephone to speak to her the matter could be dealt with by someone else because 
there were detailed procedures, and notes would be kept. In particular, 
computerisation made it almost impossible for the employer to justify the need for 
continuity. 
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Women returning from maternity leave do not have a carte blanche in order to be 
able to insist that they must return part time because of their child care 
arrangements. The employee must still show that she has suffered some sort of 
detriment. 
In Snook v. A.C. Electrical Wholesale pic (unreported), the female applicant 
failed to prove indirect sex discrimination in respect of a requirement to work fu l l 
time. Her child care arrangements, by taking into account both her parents and 
her in-laws, made the requirement quite justifiable and gave her the ability to 
comply. 
"EC sex discrimination law has been invoked more frequently before domestic 
courts and tribunals in the UK than in any other member state"11 but, on this 
occasion, it would seem that the UK approach to maternity rights is somewhat 
clearer than that of the European Court of Justice. 
Both the U K courts and the European Court of Justice have not been prepared to 
accept that indirect discrimination can be justified on economic factors, but the 
European Court of Justice has been prepared to accept administrative convenience 
as an acceptable argument. In Kirshammer-Hack v. Sidal [1994] IRLR 185. it was 
accepted that German national legislation could exclude employees working less 
than ten hours per week from employment protection, even though this had an 
indirectly discriminatory effect upon women, because women comprised the bulk 
of those working less than ten hours per week. This was on the basis that it was 
necessary to restrict the administrative and legal burdens placed upon 
1 1 Steiner, Josephine and Woods, Loma, Text book on E C Law. (1998) Blackstone, p. 360 
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organisations employing fewer than five employees. This does not appear to 
coincide with accepted models of EU law. 
Of course, the U K cases mentioned could easily have been fought on the basis of 
administrative convenience, but the U K courts have declined to accept that 
additional training, equipment, or national insurance costs, or even recruiting an 
additional member of staff, should be allowed to stand in the way of allowing 
female returners to take up their employment on a part-time or reduced hours 
basis. 
"Indirect discrimination goes some way towards acknowledging the problematic 
male norm. Recognising that certain practices obstruct the free entry of women 
into the labour force, indirect discrimination addresses situations in which 
employment practices or conditions, although treating both sexes alike in a formal 
sense, have the effect of excluding more women than men. In this way, the 
principle of equality of treatment is extended to incorporate, prima facie, 
divergences from a strictly male norm. However, there are two major limitations 
on the reach of indirect discrimination. Firstly, disproportionate impact does no 
more than establish a prima facie case on indirect discrimination. The employer 
is still permitted to defend indirectly discriminatory practices by arguing that they 
are justified for reasons which are not due to the sex of the worker. In effect then, 
the anti-discrimination principle is not a 'fundamental right', as it is frequently 
proclaimed to be, but merely a presumption which can be trumped by other 
considerations. Secondly, in its practical application, indirect discrimination does 
not make sufficiently radical inroads into the male norm. Although it has some 
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redistributive effect, it does not demand a resolution of the underlying structural 
problems which disadvantage women in the workplace."14 
In some respects, this criticism can be viewed as valid, most particularly in that a 
man could not successfully have made the claims detailed previously, for 
example, in London Underground v. Edwards, and whilst it is difficult to "trump" 
the presumption mentioned, it is, by no means, impossible. 
Of greater worry is that the back door approach does depend upon individual 
circumstances and cases, rather than a general legal right. 
The redistributive effect mentioned is also subject, in those individual cases to 
whether the individual has the ' f ight ' in her to take on the employer at what is 
undoubtedly a difficult time with conflicting demands. The issue can also rise or 
fall on whether the employee has union membership, money in the bank, legal 
expenses insurance, or access to a good law centre or the Free Representation 
Unit. Hardly a successful or acceptable approach to the maternity rights of a 
major industrialised country. 
One of the most contentious and core issues regarding U K maternity rights is that 
of a woman's right to return to work after maternity leave when such a right is 
obstructed by the woman's illness on the scheduled date of return, the illness in 
such case being for a non-pregnancy related reason. 
Under S.82 (3), (4), (5), Employment Rights Act, 1996, an employee may 
postpone her return to work until a date not more than four weeks after her 
originally notified day of return i f she is sick, and i f she has provided her 
1 4 Fredman. Sandra. European Community Discrimination Law: A Critique. (1992) 21 Industrial Law 
Journal 119, p. 125 
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employer with a medical certificate before the notified day of return. Under S.82 
(5), Employment Rights Act 1996 she is permitted only one postponement or 
extension. 
In Kellv v. Liverpool Maritime Terminals Limited [19881 IRLR 310. Mrs. Kelly 
suffered from the recurrence of an old back injury. This was towards the end of 
the extended maternity absence, and she forwarded her medical certificate to her 
employers indicating that she would not be able to return to work on the notified 
day of return. As time progressed, she sent three further certificates. At that 
stage, her employers stated that she had lost the right to return to her employment. 
The Court of Appeal held that a woman must physically return to work within the 
four week period. It was also upheld that there could be only one postponement. 
This case gives rise to serious concerns regarding U.K. maternity laws. It is 
almost certainly the case that this decision represents a discriminatory position, 
for surely any other employee returning from leave could telephone to state that 
he was sick. 
The extreme nature of this decision is illustrated by the fact that i f the husband of 
the sick female employee were to dump her from a wheelbarrow onto the floor of 
her office, she were say to touch her computer screen, and thereafter crawl back 
into the wheelbarrow, then that, according to Kelly, would be acceptable. 
In Crees v. Royal London Mutual Insurance Society Limited and Kwiksave Stores 
Limited v. Greaves 119981 ICR 849. the facts of both cases were almost identical, 
and a consolidated appeal was heard by the Court of Appeal. 
Mrs. Heather Crees and Mrs. Janet Greaves took maternity leave from their 
respective employers, and after having given birth wrote to those appropriate 
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employers giving the required periods of notice in order to return to work. In both 
cases, the four week extensions permissible under the law were taken, but in both 
cases the employees were unable to return to work on the due dates because of 
temporary illness. The employers informed their respective employees that they 
had failed to exercise their rights to return, and accordingly had no jobs. In both 
cases, the ladies sought to claim unfair dismissal. 
The Court of Appeal took the view that the employees qualified for the right to 
return to work, and that they had given all the necessary notices. The Court of 
Appeal held that under Section 42 (1) Employment Protection (Consolidation) 
Act 1978 (as it then was), the employees had exercised their rights to return to 
work by giving the appropriate written notice to their employers of their proposed 
dates of return. "Section 42 (1) sets out precisely what is required of an employee 
in order to exercise her right to return to work: "An employee shall exercise the 
right to return the work under Section 39 by giving written notice to the 
employer." Accordingly, the employees had completely and effectively exercised 
the right to return to work conferred on them when they gave written notices in 
accordance with Section 42 (1). Nothing more was required to be done for the 
right to be exercised. It follows that they had a right to claim that they had been 
unfairly dismissed, i f they were not permitted by their employer to return to 
work," per LORD WOOLF, M . R. at p. 862. 
The Court of Appeal pointed out that the only reason why they had not been 
allowed to return to work was because they had not physically been present at 
work. The court took the view that this would normally constitute a valid reason 
for absence, and would not constitute a fair reason for dismissal. Nonetheless, as 
the two ladies had given due notice, they had already exercised the right of return. 
"The machinery for postponement and extensions neither expressly nor impliedly 
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requires the employee to exercise the right by presence at the workplace to 
perform his work on the day originally notified or as postponed," per LORD 
WOOLF, M . R. at p. 862. 
It should be noted that this case is currently on appeal to the House of Lords. 
Thus, whilst there might be a more broader definition of indirect discrimination 
under EU law, but with a wider blocking mechanism, the back door route which 
allows maternity (or more properly parenting) rights to be enforced with those 
with childcare responsibilities has proved very effective under the UK's Sex 
Discrimination Act. 
I f the avenue of the Sex Discrimination Act does not appear appropriate, then it 
may well be important to consider a claim via the EU. Nonetheless, this is 
perhaps one of the more unintentional successes of unwritten UK maternity rights. 
The ethos which has surfaced in this part of U K maternity rights is summed up 
well in the final part of this extract from the judgement in Brown v. Stockton on 
Tees Borough Council [19881 IRLR 263 " I have no doubt that it is often a 
considerable inconvenience to an employer to have to make the necessary 
arrangements to keep a woman's job open for her whilst she is absent from work 
in order to have a baby, this is a price that has to be paid as part of the social and 
legal recognition of the equal status of women in the workplace," per LORD 
GRIFFITHS, at p. 266. 
Thus, women should be given both a social and legal recognition, but, as this 
chapter illustrates, some of the rights which are available are not maternity 
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specific, and certainly do not amount to cast-iron guarantees of how an employer 
must behave. 
However, U K maternity rights frequently fail in that they are not prepared to pay 
the financial price necessary to ensure success.. "Some of the poorest women with 
children, who most need to be included in the system of maternity pay, are 
currently excluded." 1 5 
1 5 House of Commons Employment Select Committee, "Mothers in Employment", (1995), Volume 1: 
Report and Proceedings of the Committee, HMSG 
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CHAPTER 3 T H E E Q U A L TREATMENT D I R E C T I V E 
It is contended that "the sex equality directives and their interpretation by the 
European Court reveal that the goals of the Equality Policy are limited: they 
strive, albeit with enthusiasm, to achieve a level playing field for competition 
between the parties ("equality of opportunity") as opposed to tackling the more 
deep rooted of inequality between men and women ("equality of outcome"). 16 
This is probably a very valid criticism, which wi l l be borne out in this chapter, but 
the contention of this paper is that it is better to do something on the ground rather 
than remain inactive and think about structural changes which w i l l probably take 
hundreds of years to achieve. (For instance, the Equal Opportunities Commission 
has estimated that it w i l l take approximately forty years for women's pay to reach 
that of their male counterparts, and this, in spite of considerable legislation. But, 
headway is being made with that legislation). It is argued that whilst U K and 
European maternity rights may fail in many respects, they do, in fact, achieve a 
modicum of equality of outcome. 
The primary directive on sex discrimination in employment law is, perhaps 
surprisingly, the Equal Pay Directive. 
European Community Law has three other major directives which cover maternity 
and associated areas, namely, the Equal Treatment Directive, the Pregnant 
Workers Directive, and the Parental Leave Directive. 
Barnard, Catherine, European Community Employment Law. (1996) Wiley, p. 245 
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The Equal Treatment Directive is Council Directive 76/207 of February 9 t n 1976 
"on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as 
regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working 
conditions". 
For the purposes of this paper, it is necessary to set out certain parts of the 
Directive in detail. 
It is provided under Article 2: 
"l .For the purpose of the following provisions, the principle of equal treatment 
shall mean that there shall be no discrimination whatsoever on grounds of sex 
either directly or indirectly by reference in particular to marital or family status. 
2. This Directive shall be without prejudice to the right of member states to 
exclude from its field of application those occupational activities, and, where 
appropriate, the training leading thereto, for which, by reason of their nature or 
the context in which they are carried out, the sex of the worker constitutes a 
determining factor. 
3. This Directive shall be without prejudice to provisions concerning the 
protection of women, particularly as regards pregnancy and maternity. 
4. This Directive shall be without prejudice to measures to promote equal 
opportunity for men and women, in particular by removing existing inequalities 
which affect women's opportunities in the areas referred to in Article 1(1)." 
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The Equal Treatment Directive further provides under Article 3 that 
" 1 . Application of the principle of equal treatment means that there shall be no 
discrimination whatsoever on grounds of sex in the conditions, including selection 
criteria, for access to all jobs or posts, whatever the sector or branch or activity, 
and to all levels of the occupational hierarchy. 
To this end, member states shall take the measures necessary to ensure that: 
(a) any laws, regulations and administrative provisions contrary to the principle 
of equal treatment shall be abolished; 
(b) any provisions contrary to the principle of equal treatment which are 
included in collective agreements, individual contracts of employment, 
interna] rules of undertakings, or in rules governing the independent 
occupations and professions shall be, or may be, declared null and void or 
may be amended; 
(c) those laws, regulations and administrative provisions contrary to the 
principle of equal treatment when the concern for protection which 
originally inspired them is no longer well founded; 
and that where similar provisions are included in collective agreements, labour 
and management shall be requested to undertake the desired revision."1 7 
When trying to deal with maternity and sex discrimination, English law has 
traditionally adopted an approach that no 'comparison' was possible. The 
reasoning has been that as a man is unable to become pregnant, there can be no 
1 7 Council Directive 76/207/EEC 
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male equivalent to a pregnant female employee and thus sex discrimination could 
never be proven. 
This was followed by the sick male comparator approach, which involved 
comparing a similar man, i.e., one absent through illness, and preferably with 
prostate problems, with the pregnant woman. 
This was to change dramatically when the European Court of Justice had referred 
to it a case from the Netherlands. 
In Dekker v. Stichting Vormingscentrum voor Jonge Voowassenen (VJV -
Centrum Plus )^ 1T9921 ICR 325. The European Court of Justice considered 
whether refusal of the employers to appoint the applicant was sex discrimination 
contrary to Articles 2 (1) and 3 (1) of the Equal Treatment Directive 
(76/207/EEC). 
The facts of the case were that a number of female applicants applied for a post as 
instructor at a training centre for young adults. 
Mrs. Dekker was considered to be the most suitable applicant for the position, and 
her name was put before the Board of Selection. Mrs. Dekker had informed her 
prospective employers that she was three months pregnant. Eventually, she was 
not appointed to the position, and the employers explained in writing that because 
she was pregnant at the time of application for the position, the employer's 
insurers would not reimburse any benefits, and that the employer itself would 
have to make payments to Mrs. Dekker during her maternity leave. In turn, this 
led to the fact that the employer would be unable to employ a replacement whilst 
Mrs. Dekker was away on maternity absence. 
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The European Court of Justice stated that "only women can be refused 
employment on the grounds of pregnancy and such a refusal therefore constitutes 
direct discrimination on the grounds of sex. A refusal of employment on account 
of the financial consequences of absence due to pregnancy must be regarded as 
based, essentially, on the fact of pregnancy. This discrimination cannot be 
justified on grounds relating to the financial loss which an employer who 
appointed a pregnant woman would suffer for the duration of her maternity 
leave," at p. 329. 
This landmark judgement therefore held that the employer was in direct 
contravention of both Articles 2 (1) and 3 (1) of the Equal Treatment Directive. 
A l l of this has swept away the comparable man idea so previously evident in 
English maternity theories. This is on the basis that the refusal to employ was 
based principally on the grounds of the woman's pregnancy. As a refusal to 
employ based on the grounds of pregnancy can be applied only to a woman, it 
was stated that such a refusal to employ was direct discrimination on the grounds 
of sex. 
Direct discrimination permits no justification, but even i f the line is blurred and 
justification is permissible, then loss of money w i l l not be a justifiable reason. 
The case is also authority for the proposition that there can be discrimination even 
where all the applicant are female. Such pregnancy related discrimination falls 
within the scope of what is prohibited by the Directive. This was put succinctly by 
Catherine Barnard - "unlike the English courts, the European court refuses to 
undertake the tortuous exercise of finding a male comparator 'suffering from an 
equivalent problem'. Instead, it struck at the heart of the problem: since only 
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women can become pregnant, less favourable treatment on the grounds of 
pregnancy automatically constitutes direct discrimination."1" 
On the face of it, Dekker would appear to provide that i f the female employee can 
show that she would not have received less favourable treatment 'but for ' 
pregnancy, then she can show breach of Article 2(1) of the Directive. The refusal 
to employ Dekker was based principally on the grounds of her pregnancy. 
However, almost immediately, the European Court of Justice began to take away 
with the left hand what it had so amazingly given with the right, and it would now 
appear that the Directive is not always breached in a situation where a pregnant 
woman has received less favourable treatment. 
The difficulty lies in what is an almost indistinguishable fine line between the 
pregnancy and the effects of the pregnancy. 
The Dekker case was followed by Handels-og Kontorfunktionaerernes Forbund i 
Danmark v. Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening [1992] ICR332 (Hertzl. 
In this case, Mrs. Hertz was employed as a part time cashier and sales woman by 
Aldi Marked K/S. By all accounts, Mrs. Hertz suffered a very difficult 
pregnancy being absent on sick leave throughout the greater part of it . Following 
the expiry of her maternity leave, Mrs. Hertz resumed work for several months, 
but between June 1984 and June 1985 she took one hundred days of sick leave as 
a result of a pregnancy related illness. Mrs. Hertz was dismissed, and alleged 
that her dismissal was contrary to articles 2 (1) and 5 (1) of the Equal Treatment 
Directive. 
Barnard, Catherine, European Community Employment Law (1996) Wiley, p. 204 
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The Court of Justice was asked to consider whether it was possible to equate a 
female employee with a male employee because a male employee could never 
suffer from a pregnancy related illness. In other words, a Dekker situation. The 
question, therefore, was whether dismissal due to illness attributable to pregnancy 
was contrary to the Equal Treatment Directive and, i f it was, was there any time 
limit to the protection available? 
It is undoubted that the European Court of Justice faced a very difficult question. 
Would it really be the case that the woman would be protected from dismissal 
because of a pregnancy related illness? I f so, where would it all end? 
The Court of Justice ruled against Mrs. Hertz confining itself to Article 2, and 
stating that there was no need to rule on the question before it under Article 5. 
It stated that i f the European Court of Justice were to accept that the dismissal of a 
female worker on account of pregnancy related illness would always infringe the 
principle of equal treatment, then "such a prohibition, which would apply to an 
employer for many years after the confinement, would be liable to entail not only 
administrative difficulties and unfair consequences for the employers, but also 
negative repercussions on the employment of women," at p. 334. 
This is a decision on social rather than legal policy. 
The European Court of Justice stated also that i f a woman were to be dismissed 
for a pregnancy related illness during her maternity leave, then this would be a 
breach of the law. However, it was decided that "in the case of an illness 
manifesting itself after the maternity leave, there is no reason to distinguish an 
illness attributable to pregnancy or confinement from any other illness. The 
pathological condition is therefore covered by the general rules applicable in the 
event of illness," at p. 335. 
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The Court continued: 
"Male and female workers are equally exposed to illness. Although certain 
disorders are, it is true, specific to one sex, the only question is whether a woman 
is dismissed on account of absence due to illness in the same circumstances as a 
man; i f that is the case, then there is no direct discrimination on grounds of sex," 
at p. 335. 
The European Court of Justice took the view that the protection available to 
women on account of pregnancy related illness during the maternity period was to 
'slot in ' with the maternity leave provided by respective national laws. It stated 
"it is for every member state to f ix periods of maternity leave in such a way as to 
enable female workers to absent themselves during the period in which the 
disorders inherent in pregnancy and confinement occur," at p. 335. 
The two above cases represent the start of the European Court of Justice's 
approach to the 'special' condition of pregnancy, but also the two quite distinct 
categories of treatment which wi l l be applied to the pre- and post- birth periods. 
It is not difficult to find criticism of the decision in Hertz. 
"In Hertz, the Court of Justice has drawn an arbitrary distinction between action 
relating to a woman's pregnancy and action taken after the pregnancy which may 
be equated with the treatment of an illness. In relation to the latter, member states 
are given discretion to determine how long post confinement protection should 
last and, once this has elapsed, the traditional comparison with the treatment of a 
male employee may play a part in deciding i f sex discrimination has occurred." 10 
1 9 Szyszczak, Erika, Community Law on Pregnancy and Maternity, in Sex Equality Law in the European 
Union, Hervey, Tamara and O'Keefe, David, (eds), (1996) Wiley, p. 54 
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To echo the words used in Dekker, presumably it should be observed that only 
women can have their employment terminated on the grounds of pregnancy 
related illnesses. The precise words in Dekker were "a refusal of employment on 
account of the financial consequences of absence due to pregnancy must be 
regarded as based, essentially, on the fact of pregnancy." This, in turn, amounts 
to direct discrimination because the condition remains unique to women. 
Economic grounds have been rejected as a supporting issue in Dekker, but surely 
the only basis for distinction between Dekker and Hertz is the economic 
difficulties which would be faced by employers. 
It is easy to agree with Erika Szyszczak's comments. " I f we are beginning to 
recognise the special nature of pregnancy and motherhood, what justification is 
there for protecting the mother only before childbirth and not afterwards when she 
and her new born baby are equally as vulnerable?"2" 
It is very difficult indeed to understand the decision in Hertz. It simply does not 
appear to make any legal sense to put in place what must be an artificial 
distinction designed only for political or business expediency. Catherine Barnard 
writes "whilst this decision can be justified by reference to practical necessity it 
can not be defended in terms of logic: i f the dismissal of a female worker on 
account of pregnancy constitutes direct discrimination, the dismissal of a woman 
on a pregnancy related illness which only women can suffer should also 
automatically constitute direct discrimination."2 1 
2 1 1 Szyszczak, Erika. Community Law on Pregnancy and Maternity, in Sex Equality Law in the European 
Union, Hervey, Tamara and O'Keefe, David, (eds), (1996) Wiley, p. 54 
2 1 Barnard, Catherine, European Community Employment Law. (1996) Wiley, p. 205 
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Another commentator makes the point, "It is apparent that the Equal Treatment 
Directive is constructed wholly within the 'sameness' - 'difference' paradigm of 
equality. Gender neutrality - identical treatment - is the norm, but in certain areas 
where a gender difference has proved problematic, such as maternity and 
occupational requirements, a special exemption to the norm is permitted. The 
Equal Treatment Directive incorporates, therefore, both identical treatment and 
special standards, with man as the undeniable measure for both "" 
"The decision in Hertz means that women are only guaranteed protection from 
dismissal relating to their pregnancy during the period of national statutory 
maternity leave. This leaves open 'abnormal' pregnancies, such as Mrs. Hertz', 
without protection - a decision justified in the Advocate General's Opinion on the 
basis that the possible 'financial difficulties' faced by the employer, and the risk 
to the 'efficient operation of the company' should override the interest of the 
exceptional case "» 
These viewpoints, it should be recalled, are unacceptable in a 'Dekker world ' . 
More's argument is developed further, and she states that if the issue of pregnancy 
were to be approached in an alternative way, however, and discrimination in law 
used as a way to remedy the disadvantages faced by pregnant women in the 
labour market, then the question of 'special rights' and of the point at which they 
are limited, would not arise (meaning, therefore, that 'abnormal pregnancies' 
could also be guaranteed protection). Yet, as long as legal protection from 
dismissal on grounds of pregnancy is conceptualised as preferential treatment for 
women, then women's disadvantaged status is obscured. 
2 2 More. Gillian. Reflections on Pregnancy Discrimination under European Community Law. (1992) 
Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 48, p. 53 
" More. Gillian. Reflections on Pregnancy Discrimination under European Community Law. (1992) 
Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 48, p. 54 
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Other commentators argue. "The other side of the principle that like should be 
treated alike is that those who are different should be treated differently. The 
Pregnancy Directive may be seen as recognition of one particular difference 
between men and women. While this approach may be welcomed in tackling an 
area of practical difficulty for female workers, it can be argued that it continues to 
uphold the male worker as the norm. Pregnant women are given specific 
employment rights because they are different from men. I f different treatment for 
women is seen as an exception to the equality principle, it may be seen as 
providing women with a special advantage. The attentions are evident in the 
legislative measures themselves, in the decisions of the European Court and the 
National Courts and in the implementation in domestic law of the European 
provisions."" 
There seems to have arisen a very distinct difference between how the European 
Court of Justice wi l l treat women. Those who are pregnant are entitled to 
extensive protection, but those who have given birth to children may well find 
themselves in a somewhat different position even i f the matter which has 
normally brought things to a head is completely connected with pregnancy. 
It would seem very much that the European Court of Justice has merely made a 
decision related to the doubtless staggering practical difficulties employers would 
suffer i f female employees were to be given almost a carte blanche to take time 
off for sickness i f that sickness could be shown to be pregnancy related. 
2 4 Burrows, Noreen and Mair, Jane, European Social Law. (1996) Wiley, p. 152 
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Robert Wintemute l , argues that "Two consequences are often seen as flowing 
from Dekker: (i) a finding of direct sex discrimination does not require a 
comparison between the treatment of a woman and the treatment of an actual or 
hypothetical man, or vice versa; and (ii) pregnancy discrimination is always direct 
rather than indirect discrimination. These propositions are not well founded and 
they make the results in the ECJ's pregnancy discrimination cases difficult to 
explain." 
Wintemute argues that a comparator is always necessary even for a direct sex 
discrimination claim, and that this was ultimately the case in Dekker, i.e., by 
looking towards those who are pregnant rather than those who are not pregnant 
(which could include both males and females). The important point about this is 
that he views discrimination against pregnant women as "prima facie indirect [my 
emphasis] sex discrimination." It is suggested that the difference in treatment 
would never have occurred "but for", and also that there has been "less 
favourable" treatment. This can only be so if there has been a comparison with the 
treatment meted out to another person. 
The problem suggests Wintemute is "who the comparator should be"? 
The author of that article suggests that the comparison between a pregnant woman 
and a non-pregnant person (male or female) does count as a comparison based on 
sex " i f one recognises that 'being (chromosomally) female' and 'being 
(chromosomally) male' are each packages of physical characteristics and physical 
capacities to make choices, and that some of these characteristics and capacities 
may have no equivalent in the package of the opposite sex .... thus, comparison of 
2 5 Wintemute, Robert. When is Pregnancy Discrimination Indirect Sex Discrimination?. (1998) 27 
Industrial Law Journal 23, p. 26 
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the sexes and a finding of direct sex discrimination remain possible where 
discrimination is based on one of these unique characteristics or capacities." 
The difficulty with this interpretation is that in Wintemute's terms the European 
Court of Justice did not travel down such a route in Dekker. 
Surely the easier (and possibly more correct) route is to suggest that the European 
Court of Justice (for whatever valid reasons) has effectively placed women on a 
pedestal because of the presently unique position a woman has in being able to 
give birth. I f one uses Wintemute's words this is not a "choice" in the same sense 
as "being male and growing a beard." 
The issue here is an all together exceptional set of circumstances, which have 
important ramifications for society as a whole. People are treated differently 
simply on the grounds they are pregnant. Whether or not the word 'sex' is the 
vehicle upon which to base complaints of such a nature may well be debatable, 
but i f one goes against certain of the feminist theories of jurisprudence then 
something must be in place to deal with pregnancy. 
As Wintemute states "the uniqueness of pregnancy is seen as such that it can not 
be compared with any other conditional situation, even if the latter gives rise to 
similar needs."2" 
By treating the pregnancy discrimination cases of the European Court of Justice 
as examples of indirect sex discrimination, the author states that he is able to 
make their outcomes easier to reconcile, but it may well be that these outcomes 
can not be reconciled other than to suggest that the ECJ realises the difficulty it 
2 f t Wintemute, Robert, When is Pregnancy Discrimination Indirect Sex Discrimination?. (1998) 27 
Industrial Law Journal 23, p. 28 
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finds itself in with the economics of trying to ensure that women never suffer any 
detriment that is in some way pregnancy related. 
In Webb v. EMO Air Cargo (U.K.) Limited 119941 ICR 770. the European Court 
of Justice was again asked to rule on Articles 2 (1) and 5 (1) of the Equal 
Treatment Directive. 
Mrs. Webb was recruited on a permanent contract to replace another employee 
(Mrs. Stewart) who was taking maternity leave. 
After Mrs. Webb had been employed for some two weeks, she informed her 
employers that she was pregnant. The applicant was dismissed a few days later. 
It was argued that the dismissal was not, in fact, on the grounds of pregnancy, but 
on Mrs. Webb's inavailability to perform the function for which she had been 
employed. 
It was stated "there can be no question of comparing the situation of a woman 
who finds herself incapable, by reason of pregnancy discovered very shortly after 
the conclusion of the employment contract, of performing the task for which she 
was recruited with that of a man similarly incapable for medical or other reasons," 
at p. 798. 
"Pregnancy is not in any way comparable with a pathological condition, and even 
less so with unavailability for work on non-medical grounds, both of which are 
situations which may justify the dismissal of a woman without discriminating on 
grounds of sex," at p. 799. 
" dismissal of a pregnant women recruited for an indefinite period cannot 
be justified on grounds relating to her inability to f u l f i l a fundamental condition of 
her employment contract. The availability of an employee is necessarily, for the 
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employer, a condition for the proper performance of the employment contract. 
However, the protection afforded by community law to a woman during 
pregnancy and after childbirth cannot be dependent upon whether her presence at 
work during maternity is essential to the proper functioning of the undertaking in 
which she is employed," at p. 799. 
Much is made in the Webb case, and that of Habermann-Beltermann", of the 
duration of the contracts, and the suggestion is put both by the European Court of 
Justice and the House of Lords in Webb that matters might well have been 
different i f the contract had been temporary. Indeed, the House of Lords goes so 
far as to suggest that it might be possible to ask questions of a female relating to 
her maternity status before entering into a temporary contract. 
This would seem to f ly in the face of all anti-discrimination law, and Jean 
Jacqmain makes the point "in certain national legislation such as in Belgium, 
there is no prohibition of fixed term contracts of employment concluded for a 
very long finite duration: would maternity leave affect such contracts differently 
from 'normal' open ended ones?"2" 
I f the contention of the European Court of Justice and the House of Lords is 
correct, then one can imagine that there would be a rush towards temporary 
contracts which might be able to exclude various maternity requirements. 
It also seems somewhat bizarre that i f it amounts to direct discrimination to refuse 
to recruit a prospective female employee on the grounds of pregnancy, then that 
direct discrimination can be side stepped on the grounds that the contract is 
temporary in nature. The courts seem to be attempting to suggest that there can 
2 7 Havermann-Beltermann v. Arbeilerwohlfahrt Bezirksverbaud Ndb/Opf e V T19941 I R L R 364 
2 , 1 Jacqmain, Jean, Pregnancy as Grounds for Dismissal. 23 Industrial Law Journal, 355, p. 356 
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be justifiability in direct discrimination. This has never met with any favour 
before, and it is surely incorrect. 
It is difficult to understand how the possibility that an employee may not be 
present to perform her duties because of pregnancy can be completely unlawful in 
the case of a permanent contract, and yet may well be perfectly lawful for a fixed 
term or temporary contract. 
Later in the article Jacqmain asks "imagine that an employer advertises a single 
position for recruitment; that this job necessarily entails exposure to the risks 
related to lead, which is prohibited for pregnant women under Article 6 Annexe I I 
(A(l))(c) of the Directive; and that it is not possible technically for the employer 
to transfer a pregnant woman to another position within his business (under 
Article 5 (2) of the Directive). I f a woman meets the required qualifications, but 
is visibly pregnant or spontaneously informs the employer that she is pregnant, is 
he still obliged to recruit her? Is he entitled to question her about her possible 
pregnancy, or even to ask her i f she wil l undergo a pregnancy test? And i f that 
employer knows that in the near or not so near future, no changes can be expected 
in the process of production or the possibilities of temporary transfer, does he 
have a right to question a female candidate on her wishes of having children?"2" 
It would seem that Dekker, Hertz, and Webb have established beyond doubt that 
the Equal Treatment Directive deals with less favourable treatment accorded to a 
woman on the grounds of her pregnancy. 
Essentially, the cases of Dekker and Webb have provided that the hypothetical 
man need no longer be considered when determining issues relating to possible 
2 g Jacqmain, Jean, Pregnancy as Grounds for Dismissal. 23 Industrial Law Journal, 355, p. 358 
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discrimination on the grounds of pregnancy. Nonetheless, a nagging problem is 
contained in the Hertz case. In this case, action arising from the pregnancy 
(namely, a pregnancy related illness) can fall to be considered as against how a 
male employee would be treated by his employer when dealing with his sickness. 
Erika Szyszczak1" writes that "the Court of Justice has drawn an arbitrary 
distinction between action relating to a woman's pregnancy and action taken after 
the pregnancy which may be equated with the treatment of an illness". She poses 
the question of why there should be a difference between the protection before 
childbirth and not afterwards. She comments further "other than the fact that the 
former is of finite period, the rational for distinguishing between the two can only 
be on policy, that is, economic grounds - precisely those grounds rejected in 
Dekker". 
"Nor does it seem to me to be possible a fortiori to draw comparisons, although 
these were referred to in the course of the proceedings, between a woman on 
maternity leave and a man unable to work because, for example, he has to take 
part in a sporting event, even if it were the Olympic Games. Other considerations 
apart, a sportsman, even a champion (whether a man or a woman) is confronted 
with a normal choice reflecting his needs and priorities in l ife; the same can not 
be reasonably said of a pregnant woman, unless the view is taken - but it would be 
absurd - that a woman who wishes to keep her job always has the option of not 
having children." Per Advocate General Tesauro, in Webb v. EMO Air Cargo 
Ltd. f1994] ICR 770. at p. 794. 
1 ( 1 Szyszczak, Erika, Community Law on Pregnancy and Maternity, in Sex Equality Law in the European 
Union, Hervey, Tamara and O'Keeffe, David, (eds), (1996) Wiley, p. 54 
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It would seem that the European Court of Justice has been unable to reconcile the 
decision Hertz with its decision in Dekker, and that the court is so confused that it 
is trying to apply Dekker whilst travelling in a completely different direction. 
In Dekker v. Stichting Vormingscentrum Voor Jonge Volwassenen fVJV -
Centrum) Plus, the ECJ took the approach that pregnancy and sex cannot be 
separated and that choosing a woman differently on the grounds of her pregnancy 
is purely and simply direct discrimination on the grounds of sex. 
In Hertz the ECJ found that the dismissal due to absences caused by illness, where 
those absences arise outside the protected period of maternity leave, is 
permissible, even where the illness is pregnancy related. Similarly, the Court's 
conclusion that the termination of Harbermann-Beltermann's contract was not "on 
the ground of pregnancy", but by reason of the statutory provision in the MSchg, 
opens the door to a narrow interpretation of the Dekker ruling that adverse 
treatment on grounds of pregnancy is direct discrimination. 
"Thus, as a matter of principle, it is not possible to justify direct discrimination on 
the grounds of sex: such discrimination is, by definition, based upon sex and 
therefore prohibited. The fact that the discrimination is based upon sex makes it 
impossible to show that it is based upon some other factor. The Court of Justice 
has stated unequivocally that where the alleged discriminatory action is based 
upon a woman's pregnancy, this amounts to sex discrimination because of 
women's unique biological role." 3 1 
1 1 Szyszczak, Erika. Community Law on Pregnancy and Maternity, in Sex Equality Law in the European 
Union, Hervey, Tamara and O'Keeffe, David, (eds), (1996) Wiley, p. 54 
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Moreover, i f Hertz and other cases such as Gillespie and Boyle (see later) and 
correct, where are the grounds in law to defend this position? The Pregnant 
Workers Directive imposes minimum standards, and the Equal Treatment 
Directive lays down the guidelines. 
Under those Directives, any adverse treatment on the grounds of pregnancy is 
(Dekker) inherently discriminatory. The European Court of Justice continues to 
exercise its (Hertz) denial of this where there is illness. 
There is illness (covered, say, by the common law), illness (which amounts to a 
disability), and a new third category (illness arising from pregnancy). This third 
category can change itself from a super-protected status in terms of dismissal (at 
least whilst on maternity leave), to a category all of its own when seeking a 
payment which equates to that granted to men absent on sick leave. 
Susan Cox discusses the difficulties," "it would be wrong to conclude that the 
principle of automatic discrimination embodied in Dekker and Webb has made 
comparisons redundant. In order to establish whether an individual woman has 
been discriminated against on the grounds of her sex, it is still necessary to 
establish whether she has been "less favourably" treated and, i f she has, whether 
that treatment was on the grounds of her pregnancy. It seems, however, that the 
relevant comparison is now between the way that the woman has been treated and 
the way that other employees or job applicants who are not pregnant were or 
would have been treated. The "but for" test of discrimination adopted in [James 
v. Eastleigh Borough Council] becomes: would this woman have received the 
same treatment but for her pregnancy?" 
1 2 Cox, Susan. Maternity and Sex Discrimination Law: where are we now?.75 E O R 23, p. 23 
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As Susan Cox identifies, the question now is "how closely does adverse treatment 
have to be connected with a woman's pregnancy or maternity for it automatically 
to amount to sex discrimination?". 
With respect to the Court, it appears impossible to reconcile the reasoning in 
Dekker with that in Hertz. The essential reason for dismissal due to a pregnancy 
related illness can not be anything other than pregnancy, and i f the Court of 
Justice has recognised that treatment arising on the grounds of pregnancy is direct 
discrimination, then the case does not sit very well with either The Pregnant 
Workers Directive, or our own Employment Rights Act 1996 which provides, 
under section 99, that dismissing a woman for a pregnancy connected reason 
(which is what a pregnancy related illness amounts to) is automatically unfair. 
"The post-birth period exists in a twilight zone between pregnancy provision, 
maternity provision and young child care provision."" 
Kilpatrick argues that the European Court of Justice's approach to the post birth 
period is not due to any lack of coherence on its part, but is instead "a deliberate 
and coherent strain in its jurisprudential approach." 
Kilpatrick analyses the various approaches to sex discrimination and pregnancy, 
namely the no-comparison possible approach (because men cannot become 
pregnant); the sick male comparator approach (e.g., the man undergoing a prostate 
operation); the no comparison necessary approach namely, that taken in Dekker 
because there is an inextricable link between pregnancy and sex and the fourth 
1 1 Kilpatrick, Clare. How long is a piece of string? European legislation of the post birth period, in 'Sex 
Equality Law in the European Union', Hervey, Tamara and O'Keeffe, David, (eds), (1996) Wiley, p. 81 
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approach, which Kilpatrick argues combines the second and third approaches, but 
in "two very different methods". 
The first of these is the distinction between illness during the protected period, 
and illness thereafter, as illustrated in Hertz. One moves from a no comparison 
necessary to a sick male comparator approach. 
Sandra Fredman argues14, " I f pregnancy is unique to women, so are its longer term 
consequences. It is difficult to see why a rigid dividing line should be drawn at 
the moment maternity leave ends, however short the leave may be." 
Kilpatrick criticises some of the feminist jurisprudential comments by asking 
what it was felt the European Court of Justice could have done. 
With the greatest of respect, the fact that open-ended protection should be 
provided for pregnant employees may well be exceedingly difficult , but it is 
surely the only logical conclusion on the directive based on the decision in 
Dekker. It may well be that the maternity rights themselves should be developed, 
but as these rights are initially developed on a political basis which, in turn, has to 
'pander' to national, regional, and sectional interests. The path to equality for 
many women has been to use laws which, it is admitted, were not primarily 
designed to ensure maternity rights, or any other of the many indirect 
discrimination routes which had been pursued by individual litigants and, in this 
country, the Equal Opportunities Commission. 
"Viewed as cases of less favourable treatment of pregnant women, Dekker, Webb, 
Hertz and Gillespie do not make sense, particularly because of the explicit or 
implicit comparator ranges from a non-pregnant man with no need for leave in 
1 4 Fredman, Sandra, European Community Discrimination Law: A Critique (1992) 21 Industrial Law 
Journal 119, p. 122 
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Dekker and Webb, to an i l l man in Hertz, to no-one (because comparison is not 
possible) in Gillespie." M 
But, the courts are deeply troubled when trying to make determinations between 
pregnancy and its consequences. 
In Berrisford v. Woodard Schools (Midlands Division) Limited [19911 ICR564. a 
matron at a girls boarding school became pregnant. She was unmarried, and 
informed her employer that she did not intend to marry in the near future. 
She was dismissed because it was felt that she would convey a very bad example 
to her pupils. The EAT held that she had not been sexually discriminated against. 
She was dismissed not for becoming pregnant, but for the poor example she 
would convey and also because had a man acted similarly (i.e., by having an 
extramarital affair) then he too would have been dismissed. 
In Q'Neil v. Governors of St. More RCVA Upper School and Bedfordshire 
County Council [19971 ICR 33. the case again concerned an unmarried member 
(on this occasion a teacher) of a school. The applicant became pregnant following 
a relationship with a Roman Catholic priest, and as she was a teacher of Religious 
Education at a Roman Catholic school, it was felt that there were certain moral 
difficulties with her remaining in employment. 
On this occasion the EAT held (per M U M M E R Y , J. at p. 47) that the pregnancy 
"precipitated and permeated the decision to dismiss" and that the ground for 
dismissal was pregnancy. 
It is certainly difficult to distinguish between the pregnancy and its consequences, 
and it is a very fine line between these two cases. Pregnancy discrimination is 
1 5 Winlemute, Robert. When is Pregnancy Discrimination Indirect Sex Discrimination?. 27 Industrial Law 
Journal 23, p. 30 
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gender related discrimination and as such is direct discrimination. As direct 
discrimination, it can not be justified. I f the consequences arise from the 
pregnancy, then surely that is a ground for pregnancy discrimination. The "but 
for"issue,again. 
Turning to another aspect of EU maternity rights, Article 2(2) of the Directive 
provides that the sex of the worker may constitute a determining factor, and that 
the Directive can be excluded from "application [to] those occupational activities 
and, where appropriate, the training leading thereto, for which, by reason of their 
nature or the context in which they are carried out, the sex of the worker 
constitutes a determining factor:" 
In Commission v. UK [1983] ECR4341. the European Court of Justice was 
prepared to allow the sex of the worker to constitute a determining factor as a 
derogation under Article 2(2) of the Equal Treatment Directive when considering 
the access of potential male employees to the post of midwife. The court took the 
view that the "personal sensitivities" involved in such a position could allow an 
exception to the principle of equal treatment. 
In Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary ri986] 
3CMLR240 discussion took place as to the possibility of exclusions from the 
Equal Treatment Directive. 
The European Court of Justice held "in determining the scope of any derogation 
from an individual right such as the equal treatment of men and women provided 
for by the directive, the principle of proportionality, one of the general principles 
of law underlying the community legal order, must be observed. That principle 
requires that derogations remain within the limits of what is appropriate and 
necessary for achieving the aim in view and requires the principle of equal 
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treatment to be reconciled as far as possible with the requirements of ... the 
context of the activity in question," at p. 267. 
Turning to the facts of the case, the Chief Constable of the RUC had deemed that 
police officers should be armed. However, he took the view that it was 
undesirable on grounds of public safety that female officers should carry firearms. 
If they were to do so, they would be more at risk of assassination than men, and it 
was also felt that female officers would be less effective in dealing with families 
and children i f they were armed. It was contended that there would be public 
distaste for such a measure. 
This led to the bizarre situation where the Chief Constable did not renew a 
number of contracts for female members of the full-time RUC Reserve. The 
European Court of Justice held that the sex of an employee could be a 
determining factor (and thus a derogation from the principle of equal treatment) 
and also that article 2(2) could allow a further derogation from the principle of 
equal treatment because "in a situation characterised by serious internal 
disturbances, the carrying of firearms by police women might create additional 
risks of their being assassinated and might therefore be contrary to the 
requirements of public safety," at p. 266. 
It was left to the national court to determine whether these issues did lead to the 
observance of the principle of proportionality. 
This decision has been heavily criticised, and it has been suggested that female 
police officers could receive the appropriate training to enable them to use 
firearms as efficiently and effectively as their male police colleagues* 
1 6 More, Gillian, 'Eoual Treatment' of the sexes: What does 'equal' mean?' (1993) 1 Feminist Legal 
Studies 45 
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In Commission v. France [1988] ECR 3559. the European Court of Justice again 
considered whether the sex of the worker could constitute a determining factor. 
This was not too difficult a case, in which the Court accepted that it was 
legitimate to employ men in the lower grades in male prisons and women in the 
lower grades in female prisons. The Court was not prepared to accept that this 
should occur at senior levels, because those in senior positions had very little 
contact of a direct nature with prisoners. 
The Directive provides "that there shall be no discrimination whatsoever of 
grounds of sex either directly or indirectly by reference in particular to marital or 
family status." But, the Directive provides for more favourable treatment for 
women in relation to pregnancy and maternity matters. "This Directive shall be 
without prejudice to provisions concerning the protection of women, particularly 
as regards pregnancy and maternity." 
This can be called either positive or affirmative action, and it was in the case of 
Hofman v. Banner Ersatzkasse [1985] ICR731. that the European Court of Justice 
dealt with the issue of the more favourable treatment permitted for those who are 
pregnant or are relying upon maternity. It was stated that the Directive recognises 
the legitimacy of protecting two aspects of a woman's needs in connection with 
pregnancy: 
a) the protection of her biological condition during pregnancy and thereafter, 
until she has physically and mentally returned to normal, and 
Council Directive 76/207 Article 2, Sub-Article 3 
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b) the special relationship between a woman and her child over the period 
following pregnancy and childbirth, by preventing that relationship from 
being disturbed by the problems which would arise from the simultaneous 
pursuit of employment. 
The circumstances of this case were somewhat complicated, with the father of a 
new-born baby seeking a payment which was normally reserved to the mother of 
the child. The facts were that the mother of the baby had taken eight weeks leave 
following childbirth (which she was legally obliged to take). She had only just 
commenced her job, and returned to work immediately after the eight week 
period. The father of the baby persuaded his employers to grant him leave to care 
for the child for the period after the eight weeks until the baby was six months 
old. This equated to the maternity leave which would have been available to the 
mother. Essentially, Hofmann wished to put himself in the position of the mother, 
and to claim the payment which would otherwise have been due to the mother. 
German law provided that only the mother was entitled to the payment, and 
Hofmann brought proceedings stating that such an approach was incompatible 
with the Equal Treatment Directive. 
The European Court of Justice stated "it is apparent from the above analysis that 
the directive is not designed to settle questions concerned with the organisation of 
the family, or to alter the division of responsibility between parents," at p. 764 
"In principle, therefore, a measure such as maternity leave granted to a woman on 
expiry of the statutory protected period falls within the scope of article 2(3) of 
directive 76/207, in as much as it seeks to protect a woman in connection with the 
effects of pregnancy and motherhood. That being so, such leave may be 
legitimately be reserved to the mother to the exclusion of any other person, in 
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view of the fact that it is only the mother who may find herself subject to 
undesirable pressures to return to work prematurely," at p. 764. 
Positive discrimination has been heavily criticised as incorporating its own form 
of discrimination, and this judgement has been subject to some criticism in that it 
perpetuates the role of the mother as the primary carer. 
"The responsibility of women for childbearing duties has been translated by the 
court in the Hofmann case as the recognition of the uniquely female experience of 
physically bearing children and the societally sanctioned function of women to 
rear the children they bear. By deeming maternity leave as an exception to equal 
treatment provisions, and ruling paternity leave is not legally required to be 
automatically granted to men who request it, discrimination against both women 
and men is perpetuated."w 
"The granting of maternity leave only denies women the opportunity to return to 
previous employment once recovery from delivery and lactation responsibilities 
are complete, unless children are put into creche facilities or a child-minder is 
employed as [currently] fathers are not legally entitled to parental leave. It also 
denies men the opportunity to rear their children on a full-time basis without 
risking loss of employment as paternity or parental leave is not provided for in 
[some] member states. The Hofmann decision unfortunately perpetuates the 
stereotyped assumption because women bear children they are therefore, 
automatically the sex that is responsible for rearing them." 
Of course, the Parental Leave Directive makes some inroads into this viewpoint. 
1 8 Bovis, Christopher and Cnossen, Christine, Stereotyped assumptions versus sex equality: A socio-legal 
analysis of equality laws in the European Union. (1996) 12 International Journal of Comparative Labour 
Law and Industrial Relations 7, p. 19 
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One of the problems is that positive discrimination measures do re-inforce 
stereotyping, such that the female within the relationship is always the primary 
carer, or that the male within the relationship is always the main breadwinner. (Of 
course, these issues would statistically be borne out from annual labour force 
surveys, etcetera and have been used to the advantage of females in cases 
concerning overtime working or mobility, etcetera, for example, Meade-Hill v. 
The British Council [19951 IRLR 478). 
In Commission v. Italy [1983] ECR 3273. Italian national law provided for a 
period of leave on the adoption of a child of less than six years of age. This leave 
was awarded only to women, for a period of three months, on a paid basis. 
The court felt that it was acceptable not to allow such leave for fathers, stating 
that the distinction was justifiable because it was necessary to assimilate as much 
as possible to entry of the child into the family to those of the arrival of the new-
born child during the initial delicate period. 
It is difficult to understand why it is necessary that this should be with the female 
member of the family as opposed to the male member of the family, and feminist 
jurisprudential arguments in such a case as this, where there is no biological bond 
(as described by the European Court of Justice) do not seem hard to understand. 
Presumably, either adopted parent is capable of performing child caring 
responsibilities. This would seem to be a stereotype of the highest order, and 
presumably i f one were to suggest at interview that a female would have either 
child-bearing or child-caring responsibilities, then this would result in an entirely 
different approach from the court. 
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Surely, as Tamara Hervey states™, "After a certain point ... maternity rights should 
give way to equal rights for both parents." 
Addressing these issues, Sandra Fredman writes, "Such an argument correctly 
highlights the need for close examination of measures purporting to benefit 
women. Any measure giving advantages to a group defined according to gender 
runs the risk the over- or under- inclusiveness and may well perpetuate damaging 
stereotypes. However, this in itself does not imply that anti-discrimination 
legislation should aspire to neutrality and thereby ignore disadvantage. The risks 
referred to need to be balanced against the possible gains of such criteria in 
reducing gender disadvantage. It may well be that social security is too costly and 
administratively too complex to test each person on an individual basis. In that 
case, it may be more advantageous overall to define a group according to gender 
than not to offer the benefit at all. On the other hand, the perpetuation of a 
stereotype may be more damaging than the overall benefit. Thus, discriminatory 
criteria should not be rejected out of hand, but instead scrutinised closely to 
discover whether they perpetuate disadvantage, or go some way toward 
alleviating i t . " * 
This is an argument with which, I suspect, many pregnant employees and mothers 
would have sympathy. It again comes back to having some benefit as opposed to 
no benefit. 
Helen Fenwick discusses various arguments relating to the types of treatment 
afforded to women.41 
•w Hervey, Tamara, Justifications for sex discrimination in employment". (1993) Butlerworths 
4 1 1 Fredman, Sandra European Community Law: A Critique (1992) 21 Industrial Law Journal 119, pp. 
129-130 
4 1 Fenwick, Helen, Special Protections for Women in European Union Law, in Sex Equality Law in the 
European Union, Hervey, Tamara and O'Keeffe, David (eds), (1996) Wiley, p. 63 
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On the one hand, it is contended that treating protective provisions as entitlements 
is invidious i f they carry with them a possibility of creating a negative impact on 
women's employment, and she reflects upon the argument put forward by 
Williams 4 2 that special treatment has grave costs for women, as it permits 
unfavourable, as well as favourable, treatment of women where differences 
between women and men can be perceived. 
However, it is recognised that there are difficulties here, not least with the 
biological issues, and the stress of the unborn child. 
It seems difficult ( i f not impossible) to deny the biological differences although 
the post birth differences may well be social in their character. 
This view is supported by other writers for it is difficult to rely upon the woman 
as the carer or upbringer of the child within a workplace environment without 
intrinsically suggesting that the woman is different from the man.41 
In Habermann-Belternann v. Arbeiterwohlfart Bezirksverband Ndb/opf eV [1994] 
IRLR364, the female employee in question worked nights in a home for the 
elderly. Shortly after the commencement of her employment, it was discovered 
that she was pregnant, and had been so at the time when she and the employers 
entered into the contract. German law prohibited night working whilst pregnant, 
and further provided that any contract which purported to permit night working 
would be treated as null and void. National law also provided that the employer 
n Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture. Courts and Feminism. (1991) in Bartlett 
and Kennedy, Feminist Legal Theory 
4 1 MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination (1991) in Bartlett and Kennedy, 
Feminist Legal Theory 
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could avoid the contract where there had been a mistake as to the personal 
characteristics of the candidate. 
The European Court of Justice held that the provision in national law which 
resulted in the avoidance of a contract of employment which was not for a fixed 
term, was in breach of the Equal Treatment Directive. The court considered the 
intention of Article 2(3) and found that to allow the termination of an open ended 
contract of employment on the basis of the prohibition against night work would 
in practice undermine the aims of Article 2(3). The inability of the female 
employee to undertake night work was only a temporary situation. 
"Having established that there is direct discrimination where the reason for the 
woman's treatment is pregnancy, i f the court was to reach a different decision in 
the context of a temporary contract, it would appear to be allowing justification of 
direct discrimination. This possibility throws into question the previously well 
established principle that there can be no objective justification of direct 
discrimination." 4 4 
Article 2(4) of Council Directive 76/207 states that "this Directive shall be 
without prejudice to measures to promote equal opportunity for men and women, 
in particular by removing existing inequalities which affect women's 
opportunities in the areas referred to in Article 1 (1)." 
Case law on this point is to be found in Commission v. France [1989] CMLR 663 
under which a French law providing special rights for females (including leave 
when children were sick, extra days leave in respect of children at the start of the 
school year, time of f for Mother's day, and shorter working hours for women over 
59) were held to be unlawful by the Court and not to equate to measures of 
Burrows, Noreen and Mair, Jane, European Social Law. (1996) Wiley, p. 156 
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positive discrimination permitted under article 2(4) of the Equal Treatment 
Directive. 
The French government had not shown that the special provisions would promote 
equal opportunity for men and women. 
The European Court has not fared well with this particular part of the Directive, 
but it is probably fair to say that there was something of the political about the 
decision. Presumably the leave days in respect of children were something which 
could easily have removed existing inequalities which affect women's 
opportunities. They decided to make a case out of shorter working hours for older 
women, or a day's holiday in respect of Mother's Day. However, the Court does 
not appear to be correct in its focus. Whilst equal opportunities should be 
promoted for men and women, it is a removal of existing inequalities and thus a 
positive statement in respect of women that is required. 
The Court considered the position of positive discrimination again in the case of 
Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen [1995] IRLR 660. A number of candidates 
sought a management post within the Bremen Public Service. After the due 
procedures had been followed, it was decided that there were two candidates of 
equal merit, namely Herr Kalanke and Frau Glismann. Local laws required that 
the female candidate should be given preference i f females were under-
represented in the employment. 
Accordingly, the female candidate was promoted, but this did not sit well with the 
European Court of Justice. It was stated "national rules which guarantee women 
absolute and unconditional priority for appointment or promotion go beyond 
promoting equal opportunities and overstep the limits of the exception in Article 
2(4)," at p. 667. 
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The judgement was extremely poorly received, and the matter was revisited in 
Marschall v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1998] IRLR 39. This case concerned a 
quota regarding promotion. Two teachers had sought promotion, and a female 
teacher who was equally qualified against a male teacher was promoted in order 
that the women's quota could be satisfied. The male applicant took exception to 
this, and the matter was referred to the European Court of Justice. 
However, in this case, the European Court of Justice declared that positive action 
could fall within Article 2(4) " I f such a rule may counteract the prejudicial effects 
on female candidates a national rule which contains a saving clause does not 
exceed those limits i f , in each individual case, it provides for male candidates who 
are equally as qualified as the female candidates a guarantee that the candidatures 
wi l l be the subject of an objective assessment which wi l l take account of all 
criteria specific to the individual candidates and w i l l override the priority afforded 
to the female candidates when one or more of the criteria tilts the balance in 
favour of the male candidate," at p. 48. 
In other words, 'we got it wrong', says the Court. A l l the European Court of 
Justice seems to be stating is that because of a hostility towards positive 
discrimination (perhaps akin to the current backlash in the United States) that the 
true meaning of the words in Article 2(4)was not applied in the Kalanke decision. 
The present case merely states that i f the one candidate is better qualified than the 
other, then that candidate wi l l receive the position. 
Let us return to sickness. Handels-Og Kontorfunktionaerernes Forbund i 
Danmark (Larson) v. Dansk Handel and Service [1997] IRLR 643. In this case 
Ms. Larson took issue with Fotex Supermarked A/S following her dismissal due 
to a pregnancy related illness. 
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The facts of this case are interesting in that they pose the question whether it is 
contrary to the Equal Treatment Directive to dismiss a woman while her 
pregnancy related illness develops during her pregnancy, and continues after the 
expiry of her maternity leave. 
The brief facts are that Ms. Larsson was off sick shortly after informing her 
employers that she was pregnant. Her first period of sick leave was relatively 
short, but her second period of sick leave lasted almost AVi months until the 
commencement of her maternity leave. Having given birth, the employee took 
some twenty four weeks maternity leave, and tagged her annual leave onto the 
end of this. After this, she remained absent due to sickness associated with the 
pregnancy related illness which caused her to be absent for the second period. 
The period of annual leave finished on 16 t n October 1992, but it was determined 
that the employee would not be able to return to work until 
4 t n January 1993. In between those two periods, on 1 0 m November 1992, 
Ms. Larsson's employment was terminated. 
The European Court of Justice held that it is not discriminatory to dismiss a 
woman after her maternity leave has ended due to her pregnancy related illness, 
even if that illness arose during the pregnancy itself. 
However, it should be borne in mind that this case was decided before The 
Pregnant Workers Directive came into force, and this was particularly noted by 
the European Court of Justice. 
"The principle of equal treatment enshrined in the Directive does not, therefore, 
preclude account being taken of a woman's absence from work between the 
beginning of her pregnancy and the beginning of her maternity leave when 
calculating the period providing grounds for her dismissal under national law. 
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"It must, however, be noted that, in view of the harmful effects which the risk of 
dismissal may have on the physical and mental state of women who are pregnant, 
have recently given birth or are breast feeding, including the particularly serious 
risk of pregnant women may be prompted voluntarily to terminate their 
pregnancy, the Community Legislator subsequently provided, pursuant to Article 
10 of Council Directive 92/85/EEC of 19th October 1992, on the introduction of 
measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant 
workers and workers who have previously given birth or are breast feeding, for 
special protection to be given to women, by prohibiting dismissal during the 
period from the beginning of their pregnancy to the end of their maternity leave, 
save in exceptional cases unconnected with their condition. It is clear from the 
objective of that provision that absence during the protected period other than for 
reasons unconnected with the employee's condition, can no longer be taken into 
account as grounds for subsequent dismissal. However, Directive 92/85 had not 
yet been adopted when Ms. Larsson was dismissed," at p. 650. 
In truth, this was an astonishing decision. Ms. Larsson was dismissed after 
effectively only four weeks of sickness, leaving aside her absence during the 
pregnancy period, the maternity leave, and her annual leave. 
Relying on Hertz, it seems impossible to conceive that a so called comparable 
man would have been dismissed following the maternity leave period after a 
sickness absence of only four weeks. 
Furthermore, as stated above, The Pregnant Workers Directive would now lead to 
a completely different outcome to this case, and the case has also been 
disapproved by the European Court of Justice itself. 
One interesting point to consider is the United Kingdom's possible difficulty with 
this decision in the light of Section 99, Employment Rights Act 1996, which 
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provides for automatically unfair reasons for dismissal in pregnancy connected 
reasons. 
It is the cause of the unavailability for work which is important, not the 
unavailability for work itself. This does not seem such a difficult argument to 
unravel. After all, whilst it is perfectly possible to dismiss sick employees, those 
who conform to the definition of 'disabled' under the Disability Discrimination 
Act are allowed a significantly greater protection than those who do not, and they 
must not be treated differently simply on the grounds of the disability, unless 
there is significant justification, and unless the employer has complied with the 
duty to make reasonable adjustments. 
It is admitted that this does differ from direct discrimination (where no 
justifiability is supposedly available), but it shows that the physical condition can 
move. 
A person with significant absenteeism who is not disabled, is in a much worse 
position than one who is. Surely this is akin to the position of pregnancy. 
If one were to accept the arguments in Wintemute's paper, then one can not 
imagine the difficulties that would flow in respect of justifiability. Most 
employers are already far from keen to incur additional cost, and many would 
willingly dispose of a pregnant employee rather than wait for her to return 
following her maternity leave. 
The current disappointing position is summed up well by Bovis and Cnossen 
"From a social perspective, stereotyped assumptions have appeared as guiding 
rationale for continuing sex discrimination and unequal treatment and undermine 
full labour integration in the common market. From a legal perspective, the 
refusal to accept the legality of paternity leave; recognise full rights of part-time 
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workers; establish adequate schemes to implement equal pay for work of equal 
value in employment including female dominated occupations which have no 
male comparator; eliminate sex as a determinant factor for employment; and to 
end different pensionable ages for men and women all demonstrate that sex 
discrimination persists despite measures to eliminate it."* 
Several of the problems highlighted in the paragraph above are now being 
addressed by the U K and European legislatures, and the recent decision in Levez 
v. T. H. Jennings [1999] I R L R 36 could have a dramatic effect upon the 
establishment of equal pay between men and women. 
In Gillespie v. Northern Health and Social Services Board [19961 ICR498. the 
European Court of Justice was asked to rule on matters concerning both equal pay 
and equal treatment. 
Essentially, the case concerned Mrs. Joan Gillespie and sixteen of her colleagues 
who had taken maternity leave from various health authorities in Northern 
Ireland. 
Whilst away on maternity leave, the applicants received full weekly pay for four 
weeks, 90% of their pay for two weeks, and 50% of their pay for twelve weeks. 
Whilst the applicants were away on maternity leave, a backdated pay increase was 
made, and the applicants did not receive the increase. Furthermore, the applicants 
claimed that their pay should not have been reduced whilst they were away on 
maternity leave, stating that they should have received full pay. 
So, the court was asked to rule on an issue which basically was political dynamite. 
4 5 Bovis, Christopher and Cnossen, Christine, Stereotyped assumptions versus sex equality: A socio-legal 
analysis of equality laws in the European Union. (1996) 12 International Journal of Comparative Labour 
Law and Industrial Relations 7, p. 23 
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The Court of Justice held that neither article 119 nor the directive required that 
women should continue to receive full pay during their maternity leave, and nor 
did it 'lay down any specific criteria for determining the amount of benefit to be 
paid to them during that period.... [so long as... ] the amount payable could not, 
however, be so low as to undermine the purpose of maternity leave, namely the 
protection of women before and after giving birth,' at p. 513. 
The Court of Justice took the view that there could be no comparison between a 
woman who was absent on maternity leave and a man who was absent on sick 
leave in terms of the pay that both would receive. It would not be possible to 
compare the situation of a man at work with that of a woman on maternity leave -
'they are in a special position which requires them to be afforded special 
protection, but which is not comparable either with that of a man or with that of a 
woman actually at work,' at p. 513. 
But, it appears in itself discriminatory to suggest that the various types of leave 
can be treated differently. Surely the Court is confused in its assertion that one 
type of absenteeism is to be singled out for what, in may cases, is a lower rate of 
pay. The special treatment should afford no less status than the disabled man, 
even if he is not to be used as a comparator. 
"The reasoning in the case is thin; the outcome inevitable. The Pregnant 
Workers' Directive in general, and, in particular, the levels of maternity pay 
which employers should be obliged to pay, was the outcome of a compromise 
between the member states; for the European Court of Justice to hold that, after 
all, full pay was payable throughout the pregnancy would have been politically 
unthinkable."4* 
Townshend-Smith, Richard J . , Discrimination Law: Text Case and Materials. (1998) Cavendish, p. 201 
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This, of course, is the central issue. Women are unable to take advantage of 
maternity leave if the pay is inappropriate. The court's reluctance to set this level 
of pay at something approaching a sensible level is, to say the least, a dramatic 
hindrance. 
In this country, the statutory entitlement is to six weeks at 90% of pay, with 
twelve weeks at about £57, and thereafter nothing. 
In Brown v. Rentokil Limited [1998] ICR790. the applicant became ill some eight 
weeks after becoming pregnant. She was absent and never returned to work. 
The employer's contract of employment contained a clause that anyone who was 
incapable of work for a period of more that 26 weeks would be dismissed, and 
Mrs. Brown was subsequently dismissed. 
Mrs. Brown argued that she had been dismissed contrary to Articles 2(1) and 5(1) 
of the Equal Treatment Directive, and also that she had been unfairly dismissed 
contrary to the Employment Protection Consolidation Act 1978 (as it then was). 
The employer argued that all were treated in the same manner under the contract 
of employment, which provided for dismissal after 26 weeks of ill health. The 
Court stated that the Directive "recognises the legitimacy, in terms of the 
principle of equal treatment, first, of protecting a woman's biological condition 
during and after pregnancy and, secondly, of protecting the special relationship 
between a woman and her child over the period which follows pregnancy and 
childbirth," at p. 824. 
"It was precisely in view of the harmful effects which the risks of dismissal may 
have on the physical and mental state of women while pregnant, women who have 
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recently given birth or women who are breastfeeding, including the particularly 
serious risk that pregnant women may be prompted voluntarily to terminate their 
pregnancy, that the community legislature, pursuant to article 10 of council 
directive (92/85/EEC) of 19 t h October, 1992 on the introduction of measures to 
encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and 
workers who have recently given birth or are breast feeding (10 t n individual 
directive adopted within the meaning of article 16 (1) of Directive (89/391/EEC)), 
which was to be transposed in to the laws of the member states no later than two 
years after its adoption, provided for special protection to be given to women, by 
prohibiting dismissal during the period from the beginning of their pregnancy to 
the end of their maternity leave. Article 10 of directive (92/85/EEC) provides 
that there is to be no exception to or derogation from, the prohibition of dismissal 
of pregnant women during that period, save in exceptional circumstances not 
connected with their condition ," at p. 825. 
The Court continued "although pregnancy is not in any way comparable to a 
pathological condition (Webb, para. 25), the fact remains, as the Advocate 
General stresses in paragraph 56 of his opinion, a pregnancy is a period during 
which disorders and complications may arise compelling a woman to undergo 
strict medical supervision and, in some cases, to rest absolutely for all or part of 
her pregnancy. Those disorders and complications, which may cause incapacity 
for work, form part of the risks inherent in the condition of pregnancy and thus 
are a specific feature of that condition," at p. 825. 
" ... dismissal of a female worker during pregnancy for absences due to incapacity 
for work resulting from her pregnancy is linked to the occurrence of risks 
inherent in pregnancy and must therefore be regarded as essentially based on the 
fact of pregnancy. Such a dismissal can affect only women and therefore 
constitutes direct discrimination on the grounds of sex," at p. 826. 
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The European Court of Justice went on to state that dismissing a female worker at 
any time during her pregnancy would clearly be in breach of both articles 2(1) and 
5(1) of the Equal Treatment Directive. 
Interestingly, the European Court of Justice went on to consider the Larsson case, 
Handels-Og Kontorfunktionaerernes Forbund i Danmark v. Dansk Handel and 
Service [1997] E C R I - 2757. stating that that case had been disapproved. 
The Court stated the contrary to its ruling in the Larsson case, "where a woman is 
absent owing to illness resulting from pregnancy or childbirth, and that illness 
arose during pregnancy and persisted during and after maternity leave, her 
absence not only during maternity leave but also during the period extending from 
the start of her pregnancy to the start of her maternity leave cannot be taken in to 
account for computation of the period justifying her dismissal under national law. 
As to her absence after maternity leave, that may be taken in to account under the 
same conditions as a man's absence, of the same duration, through incapacity for 
work," at p. 826. 
It was also held that the contractual term permitting dismissal of employees of 
both sexes after 26 weeks would, in these circumstances, constitute direct 
discrimination. 
Whilst the Court of Justice has served only to confuse itself, and subject itself to 
considerable criticism, the United Kingdom maternity rights now seem to be 
outstripping those of the previously less hostile European Court. Good examples 
of this are to be found in the following cases (although it is conceded that 
Halfpenny is not outstanding). 
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In Caledonia Investment and Property v. Caffrey [1998] I R L R 110, Mrs. Sandra 
Caffrey was dismissed by her employers following a bout of post- natal 
depression. 
The contract of employment had continued to subsist, and the Employment 
Appeal Tribunal held "that if a pregnancy related illness arises during the relevant 
period, that is to say the period of maternity leave whether extended or not, which 
is the direct cause of dismissal in due course, as is the situation in the present 
case, then section 99(1) (a) is able to cover that position, even if it leaves an 
employer exposed for a considerable period of time to the consequences of having 
to keep such an employee who is ill for a pregnancy related reason on his books," 
per LORD JOHNSTON, at p. 112. 
The E A T went on to hold that if a woman is dismissed for an illness related to 
giving birth or being pregnant or both, then if that illness has arisen during the 
maternity leave period (even if the dismissal takes place after that period) it is a 
discriminatory dismissal. This is on the basis that at the time of the dismissal 
Mrs. Caffery was suffering from an illness from which a man could not suffer, 
and thus she was being treated differently from her male counterparts. 
In Halfpenny v. I G E Medical Systems Limited [1999]IRLR 177. Mrs. Marion 
Halfpenny was employed as a Regional Administrator. She became pregnant, and 
began to suffer from complications. Her contract of employment entitled her to 
paid sick leave of 30 weeks in any twelve month period, and she remained unfit to 
return to work. 
She gave notice to the employers that she intended to return to work 29 weeks 
after the birth of the baby, and she gave further appropriate notice of her intention 
to return, being informed by the employers that that would be on 30 t n October, 
1995. 
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Approximately a fortnight before that return date the applicant sought to delay her 
return to work on the grounds of her ill health, confirming that she was suffering 
from post-natal depression. Her employers allowed her to delay her return until 
27 t n November, but she informed them that she doubted she would be able to 
return in November. 
The employers declined to extend her period of absence any further, and they 
further declined to hold open her position. 
The applicant claimed automatically unfair dismissal, wrongful dismissal, and sex 
discrimination. 
The Court of Appeal held that Mrs. Halfpenny was correct in all respects. 
Following the decisions in Kwiksave Stores Limited v. Greaves and Crees v. 
Royal London Mutual Insurance, the process of exercising the right to return to 
work is complete once the appropriate notices have been given for the notified 
date of return. The appellant had therefore been dismissed when her contract was 
treated as having come to an end. Additionally, the Court of Appeal held that the 
company should have held open Mrs. Halfpenny's contract after the expiry of her 
maternity absence. 
Furthermore, she had been "unlawfully discriminated against in that the 
employers made no attempt to procure medical evidence as to the likelihood of 
returning to work, and refused to allow her paid sick leave to which she was 
contractually entitled as they would have done with a man, as evidenced with the 
actual man with whom she sought to compare herself. That finding of unlawful 
discrimination is not and can not be challenged," per WARD, L . J . at p. 183. 
But, the special protection available under U K law in s.99, relating to the 
employee taking maternity leave extended only to the 14 week period, although 
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this was on a strict construction of the statutory meaning of the maternity leave 
period. 
Whilst this element of the decision may have merit, it is, once again, difficult to 
comprehend the basis on which the U K and El ) maternity rights seek to apply 
different rules to what is essentially the same situation, i.e., a return to work. 
Sandra Fredman^ discusses the special protections available in terms of the type 
of equality which European Community Law seeks to achieve between men and 
women. 
Formal equality, it is argued, is based upon a male model of employment, and is 
thus intrinsically discriminatory. 
This means that the protective measures under European Law can perpetuate 
stereotypical ideas about male and female roles, and to remove all such protective 
legislation may advance formal equality between the sexes, but may not improve 
the real position of female employees on the ground. 
I am inclined to agree with Sandra Fredman's observations that equality should 
be replaced by "directives containing specific rights .... thus pregnancy attracts 
rights for its own sake rather than on the basis of artificial comparisons" m 
In Hofmann, the European Court of Justice stated that Article 2(3) dealt not only 
with the protection of the mother's biological condition during or after pregnancy 
until such time as her physiological and mental functions have returned to normal, 
but also at the special relationship between a woman and her child which may be 
4 7 Fredman, Sandra, European Community Discrimination Law: A Critique. (1992) 21 Industrial Law 
Journal 119 
4" Fredman, Sandra, European Community Discrimination Law, A Critique. (1992) 21 Industrial Law 
Journal 119, p. 134 
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disturbed by the multiple burdens which would ensue from simultaneous pursuit 
of employment. 
Thus, the court recognises that the mother will have a certain biological condition 
during or after pregnancy, or both. It also accepts that the mother's physiological 
and mental functions will need time to return to normal. 
Given these comments, (and leaving aside the fact that such comments would 
appear to perpetuate stereotyping), one finds it difficult to accept that the Court in 
Hertz can draw a line in the sand quite simply at the end of the maternity leave 
period. 
On this wording, it would seem that the Court of Justice is arguing against itself, 
and one is led yet further down the route that Hertz was an economic response to 
an incredibly difficult question. 
It is conceded that the Parental Leave Directive will go some way towards 
changing the position here, although it is unpaid within the United Kingdom. Our 
partners often have a different approach. 
"All types of leave in the post birth period do not have to be labelled as either 
maternity or parental leave. For example, under Italian law, while maternity law 
lasts twelve weeks after the birth, dismissal of a woman on grounds related to 
pregnancy is outlawed for twelve months after the birth."4'' 
Perhaps very worryingly, after over 20 years of development within the UK, the 
law surrounding pregnancy and maternity rights remains unclear, and there is a 
regular stream of cases before the national courts and the European Court of 
1 , 9 Kilpatrick, Clare, How long is a piece of string? European legislation of the post birth period, in 'Sex 
equality law in the European Union', Hervey, Tamara and O'Keeffe, David (eds), (1996) Wiley, p. 95 
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Justice seeking clarification of what are major issues to both employers and 
pregnant employees. An excellent insight into one of the factors which has led to 
this state of affairs is found in the following article: 
" .... the equal treatment principle leads to an inadequate consideration of the 
question of who should bear the social cost of pregnancy and childbearing. 
Because the principle translates into an obligation placed upon the individual 
employer, the courts are prompted to require justification for placing the cost of 
pregnancy on that employer. But this ignores the fact that sparing an 'innocent' 
employer leaves the whole cost with the woman and prevents any consideration of 
the potential cost-spreading role of the state."5" 
The rapid growth area of sex discrimination law is in the indirect field and we 
have lately heard much of the word 'institutionalised' in respect of discrimination 
issues. 
In Griggs v. Duke Power Company 401US424(T97D. Chief Justice Warren 
Burger stated "Congress has now provided that tests or criteria for employment or 
promotion may not provide equality of opportunity merely in the sense of the 
fabled offer of milk to the stork and the fox. On the contrary, Congress has now 
required that the posture and condition of the job seeker be taken in to account. It 
has - to resort again to the fable - provided that the vessel in which the milk is 
proffered be one all seekers can use. The ... act proscribes not only overt 
discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in 
operation," at p. 853 (para. 431). 
This is much more difficult in practice, and calls (obviously) for a more US like 
approach, rather than that which has been favoured throughout the E U . The latter 
5 0 Fredman. Sandra. A difference with distinclion: Pregnancy and Parenthood Reassessed, (1994) 110 
L Q R 1 0 6 , p . I l l 
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has been subject to great criticism by the feminist jurisprudential movement in 
that the special treatment which might need to be afforded to certain groups 
within society serves only to segregate those groups, and to confirm their position 
as 'underperformers'. 
The special treatment afforded often "treats women as victims and devalues 
them."51 A further feminist jurisprudential criticism of equality laws is that they 
lead to female employees being offered equality with their male counterparts. 
This therefore makes the male position the norm. 
As this chapter has shown, female jurisprudential writers have hit at the very heart 
of the problem: the role of the female. As Lucinda Findlay has said, "The fact 
that women bear children and men do not has been the major impediment to 
women becoming fully integrated into the public world of the workplace." ,2 
Considering Dekker, Sandra Fredman writes" that the argument that pregnancy is 
a condition affecting only women and as such dismissal constitutes sex 
discrimination on those grounds. This is surely not on the basis that it applies 
only to women. 
If this is the case, would a man be able to claim special protection if having to 
take time off for a prostate operation? Does the law in effect fail to recognise the 
role that women play in social terms, and the interest that society as a whole 
should have in that? The answer is probably yes. 
5 1 Lacey, N., Legislation against sex discrimination: questions from a feminist perspective. (1987) J4 
Journal of Law and Society 411, p. 416 
5 2 Findlay, Lucinda, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of The Maternilv and Workplace Debate. 
(1986) 86 Columbia Law Review 1118, p. 1119 
5 1 Fredman, Sandra. A Difference with Distinction: Pregnancy and Parenthood Reassessed (1994) 110 
L Q R 106 
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